




THE SEC’S POTENTIAL APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE DEFECT AND HOW IT 
COULD IMPACT THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
Randall Bryer∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Twice since the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States 
corporate and financial sectors have been embroiled in scandals, which have 
been covered heavily in the national news media.1   The persistent negative 
publicity led to widespread public outrage and swift congressional response 
in the form of increased regulation and oversight.  Following the corporate 
accounting scandals in 2001, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), which created the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).2  In 2010, the Supreme Court held that the 
PCAOB’s two layers of for-cause removal violated the separation of powers 
and the vesting of executive power in the President by insulating the Board 
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 1 The first scandal occurred after Enron’s collapse in 2001 and other accounting scandals, 
when criticism rained down on these companies and, “[a]s the audit failures piled up on 
one another, investors lost confidence in managers, market intermediaries and auditors 
alike.”  William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1023 (2003); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Worries of 
More Enrons to Come Give Stock Prices a Pounding, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at C1 (reporting 
on the Enron scandal’s effects on the economy).  The second scandal occurred after the 
2007 financial crisis, when millions of homes were foreclosed on and governments and 
banks worldwide spent more than $17 trillion assisting financial institutions.  Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail 
Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 957 (2011) (detailing the severe and far-reaching nature of 
the financial crisis); Laura Kusisto, Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t 
Return—NAR, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2015, 12:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/many-
who-lost-homes-to-foreclosure-in-last-decade-wont-return-nar-1429548640. 
 2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (establishing PCAOB, “in order to 
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of 
informative, accurate, and independen audit reports for companies the securities of 
which are sold to, and held by and for, public investors”). 
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from presidential oversight or control.3  Following the 2007 global financial 
crisis, Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or “Dodd-Frank Act”),4 which 
increased the scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) 
regulatory and enforcement capabilities.5  Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
SEC could require only registered brokers and investment advisers to pay 
fines in in-house proceedings presided over by Administrative Law Judges 
(“ALJs”),6 whereas it only could bring insider trading, securities fraud, or 
accounting fraud actions against unregistered individuals in federal court.7  
Indeed, in 2013, the SEC filed 755 actions in the prior year—the most in its 
history for a given year—ranging from “market structure to financial 
reporting, asset management to insider trading, municipal securities, FCPA, 
and more,” which netted the SEC $16 million in penalties.8  Dodd-Frank 
empowered the SEC to decide where to bring enforcement proceedings.9 
In the years following congressional action and the eventual decrease in 
public and congressional outrage,10 however, the affected industries have 
 
 3 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010) 
(holding that because the President was unable “to oversee the Board, or to attribute the 
Board’s failings to those whom he [could] oversee, [he was] no longer the judge of the 
Board’s conduct,” which “is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the executive power in the 
President”).  However, this victory was more symbolic than substantive, since the Court 
merely severed the statute’s for-cause removal provision, leaving intact the Board’s broad 
powers.  Id. at 508; Jerome Nelson, Administrative Law Judges’ Removal “Only For Cause”: Is 
That Administrative Procedure Act Protection Now Unconstitutional?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 401, 
408 (2011) (“Despite language which may have pleased the plaintiffs philosophically, the 
decision had no impact on the Board’s investigation of the accounting firm, nor did it 
alter the PCAOB’s rules, policies, or procedures.”). 
 4 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 5 See infra Part I.A. 
 6 See 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995) (delineating the responsibilities that SEC ALJs have). 
 7 Peter J. Henning, The S.E.C.’s Use of the ‘Rocket Docket’ Is Challenged, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Aug. 25, 2014, 11:48 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/25/the-s-e-c-s-use-of-
the-rocket-docket-is-challenged/?_r=0; see also Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Securities and 
Exchange Comm’n Div. Enf’t, Remarks to the American Bar Association’s Business Law 
Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370543515297 (explaining how penalties against entities not regulated 
by the SEC were only available in the district court before the Dodd-Frank Act was 
enacted). 
 8 Ceresney, supra note 7. 
 9 See Josh Beckerman, SEC Proposes Changes to Administrative Proceedings, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
24, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-proposes-changes-to-administrative-
proceedings-1443133524 (noting that partly due to the enhanced powers accorded to the 
SEC under Dodd-Frank, “[t]he agency has increasingly steered cases to hearings in front 
of its appointed administrative judges rather than taking them to federal court”). 
 10 See Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/23/business/the-financial-crisis-already-
forgotten.html?_r=0 (describing a House Financial Services Committee hearing in which 
some congressmen questioned the need for the Financial Stability Oversight Council, 
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sought to invalidate the recently enacted changes by suing in federal court.11  
In September 2015, the SEC responded to Due Process challenges to its ALJ 
proceedings by proposing new rules that provide for more thorough 
hearings, which it claimed would “modernize our rules of practice for 
administrative proceedings, including provisions for additional time and 
prescribed discovery for the parties.”12  On July 29, 2016, the SEC adopted 
the amendments “substantially as proposed.”13  The SEC’s use of ALJs for 
enforcement actions previously brought in federal courts has been a 
particular source of strife. 
The purpose of this Comment is to examine whether the SEC’s ALJ 
appointments violate Article II’s Appointments Clause.  If ALJs are inferior 
officers, as has been argued, then the President, a court of law, or a 
department head must appoint them.14  Unlike other legal works to date, 
this Comment analyzes the effects of an Appointments Clause violation on 
both the SEC and the administrative state as a whole.  Even if the Supreme 
Court were to rule that no constitutional infirmity exists, the Comment 
argues that the challenges would have been successful at least in part 
because the SEC and Congress have already responded to the negative 
publicity stemming from the Due Process and Appointments Clause claims. 
Part I briefly explains how the recent financial crises have contributed to 
the contentious climate with respect to the SEC and provides background 
information on the SEC’s enforcement scheme and statutory structure, as 
well as the appointment process of SEC ALJs and the powers ALJs possess.  
Part II discusses the merits of the more recent structural constitutional 
challenges.  First, it considers whether federal jurisdiction exists prior to the 
completion of an administrative proceeding.  Assuming jurisdiction exists, it 
discusses whether the Appointments Clause and the two layers of for-cause 
removal challenges are likely to succeed.  Both challenges depend on 
whether ALJs are inferior officers.  Historically, the Supreme Court has not 
established clear criteria for what constitutes an inferior officer.15  The Court 
 
which had been established under Dodd-Frank to ensure that financial institutions would 
have enough capital to avoid future financial crises). 
 11 See infra Part II (discussing the challenges that litigants have posed to the SEC’s ability to 
bring administrative enforcement actions under Dodd-Frank). 
 12 Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceedings 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-209.html. 
 13 Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50212-01, 50214 (July 
29, 2016) (codified at 71 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2016)). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such 
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.”). 
 15 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (“In the practical course of the 
government there does not seem to have been any exact line drawn, who are and who are 
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may be wary of upending the administrative state by holding that ALJs are 
inferior officers. 
Part III considers the potential repercussions for the SEC if the Supreme 
Court were to rule that ALJs are inferior officers.  It examines how other 
agencies that were recently found to have had defective appointments—the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)—dealt with these challenges and how it 
affected prior decisions.  It also considers the effects a finding that ALJs are 
inferior officers would have on the Social Security Administration—the 
agency that relies most heavily on ALJs—as well as on other agencies.16 
Part IV argues that even if the Court does not eventually rule that ALJs 
are inferior officers, the current litigation already has and likely will 
continue to change SEC practices.  The Due Process and Equal Protection 
claims against the SEC are expected to fail.17  In spite of their weaknesses as 
legal claims, however, they have been highly influential in pressuring the 
SEC to modernize its in-house proceedings.  Likewise, even if the 
Appointments Clause claim fails, it is likely to transform SEC decisions about 
whether to bring enforcement actions in federal courts or before ALJs.  
Indeed, the SEC has already responded to the challenges against its use of 
ALJs.18 
In the conclusion, I argue that both the Due Process and Appointments 
Clause arguments have contributed to bringing about the substantive 
changes sought by the SEC’s challengers, and that neither argument, by 
itself, would have been sufficient.  Although the Due Process claims are 
unlikely to prevail in court, they have inspired significant public 
condemnation of the SEC’s in-house proceedings,19 leading the SEC to ratify 
 
not to be deemed inferior officers, in the sense of the constitution, whose appointment 
does not necessarily require the concurrence of the senate.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 16 See Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Should Congress Create a Special Category of SSA ALJs?, 38 ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS 5, 5 (Winter 2013) (noting that the SSA employs 1400 ALJs, a figure that 
accounts for approximately 85% of all ALJs). 
 17 See infra Part IV.A 
 18 See infra Part IV.B. 
 19 E.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015 10:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803; Jean Eaglesham, 
SEC Gives Ground on Judges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2015, 8:30 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-1443139425; Henning, supra 
note 7; Nate Raymond, U.S. Judge Criticizes SEC Use of In-House Court for Fraud Cases, 
REUTERS (Nov 5. 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/us-sec-
fraud-rakoff-idUSKBN0IP2EG20141105#6qxy9Y4k8dl23RSB.97; Russell G. Ryan, The SEC 
as Prosecutor and Judge, WALL ST. J. (Aug 4, 2014, 7:36 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/russell-g-ryan-the-sec-as-prosecutor-and-judge-1407195362; 
Bob Van Voris & Matt Robinson, For the SEC’s In-House Court, a Question of Justice for All, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2015, 5:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
08-10/for-the-sec-s-in-house-court-a-question-of-justice-for-all; Daniel Fisher & Daniel R. 
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new rules to provide for greater process,20 and moving Congress to propose 
legislation giving those subject to SEC civil actions the option of having the 
proceeding take place before an ALJ or a federal judge.21  What impact the 
Appointments Clause challenges have on ALJs in other agencies will hinge 
on whether and on what grounds the Court were to find an Appointments 
Clause defect, the retroactive effect of such a ruling, and the willingness of 
litigants in other agency proceedings to raise Appointments Clause issues. 
I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AND THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT 
AND ADJUDICATORY SCHEME 
To best understand the motivation behind the recent string of 
challenges and the current salience of the issue, it is important to consider 
the tension between Wall Street and Congress (mostly its Democrats22) and 
Congress’s periods of consternation following these crises.  This is helpful in 
understanding the impetus behind the challenges discussed below. 
A. Recent Expansion of the SEC’s Enforcement Capabilities 
Public outrage following the 2008 financial crisis23 and the widespread 
belief that there was not enough government regulation over Wall Street24 
led the Democratic-controlled Congress to increase the enforcement power 
of the SEC to better regulate and punish the financial sector.25 
 
Walfish, The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix It, FORBES (July 
20, 2015, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/07/20/the-real-
problem-with-sec-administrative-proceedings-and-how-to-fix-it. 
 20 See Press Release, SEC, supra note 12. 
 21 Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015). 
 22 Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift on 
Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html  (reporting on the 
passage of a bill aimed at expanding federal financial regulation, which had been heavily 
promoted by congressional Democrats). 
 23 See Michael Erman, Five Years After Lehman, Americans Still Angry at Wall Street: Reuters/Ipsos 
Poll, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wallstreet-
crisis-idUSBRE98E06Q20130915 (“As many as 44 percent of those polled believe the 
government should not have bailed out financial institutions . . . . Fifty-three percent 
think not enough was done to prosecute bankers . . . .” ). 
 24 See Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, 
at A1 (reporting that according to former Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke, 
regulatory failure was the primary cause of the housing bubble and subsequent financial 
crisis). 
 25 Indeed, the SEC reported that for fiscal year 2015, its ALJs issued “207 initial decisions, 
held twenty-seven hearings, and ordered civil penalties totaling $20,823,750 and 
disgorgement totaling $12,065,036.”  SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
http://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited Sept. 15, 2016). 
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As a result, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act—mostly along party 
lines26—“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to 
protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.”27  Dodd-Frank gave the SEC the authority to impose monetary 
fines against individuals28 and to choose whether to bring enforcement 
actions in federal court or within the agency, where it may either appoint an 
ALJ or have the action decided by the Commission itself.29  Prior to Dodd-
Frank, the SEC’s in-house enforcement had been limited to cease-and-desist 
orders against further illegal activity and to equitable relief in the form of 
disgorgement against regulated individuals or entities.30 
B. Background on the ALJ Hiring and Hearing Process 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) permits agencies to appoint 
ALJs to preside over hearings.31  Agencies long have relied on hearing 
officers—previously referred to as examiners.32  The SEC has defended its 
use of ALJs—an authority, it argues, that Congress has provided to it in both 
the APA and Dodd-Frank.  The SEC notes that it has used ALJs “throughout 
the 42-year history of the Division of Enforcement” and that these “ALJs 
have been presiding over and adjudicating complex securities cases for 
decades.”33 
 
 26 See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009: House Roll Vote No. 968 
(Dec. 11, 2009) p. H.R. 4173, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2009/roll968.xml (reporting 
that the overwhelming majority of congressional Democrats voted in favor of Dodd-
Frank, while zero Republicans did so); Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2009: Senate Roll Vote No. 162 (May 20, 2010) p. H.R. 4173, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=1
11&session=2&vote=00208 (reporting that the vast majority of U.S. senators who voted in 
favor of the bill’s passage were Democrats). 
 27 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2010) (permiting the SEC to impose civil penalities of varying 
amounts on violators of Dodd-Frank). 
 29 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t-u. 
 30 Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History and 
Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 392–96 
(2008). 
 31 See generally 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(a), 557(b) (2012) (authorizing at least one ALJ to preside at 
the evidence-collecting stage of the hearing, and, under certain circumstances, to decide 
the case altogether); id. § 3105 (requiring that agencies “appoint as many administrative 
law judges as are necessary”). 
 32 See VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: 
AN OVERVIEW 1 n.2 (2010), http://ssaconnect.com/tfiles/ALJ-Overview.pdf (“In 1978, 
Congress changed the title ‘hearing examiners’ to ‘Administrative Law Judges.’”). 
 33 Ceresney, supra note 7. 
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1. The ALJ Hiring Process 
Congress permits the SEC to hold hearings before either the 
Commission or a designated officer, i.e. an ALJ.34  The Office of Personnel 
Management (“OPM”) oversees the pool of potential ALJ candidates and 
creates the standards and qualifications needed to become an ALJ.35  When 
an agency wishes to hire an ALJ, OPM provides it with three ALJs to choose 
from,36 and ranks them “according to their qualifications and skills.”37  An 
agency may borrow ALJs from another agency, a process that OPM 
oversees.38  ALJs are qualified and experienced attorneys.39  Of importance 
for this Comment, the SEC conceded that the Commissioners do not 
appoint its ALJs, but rather the SEC’s Chief ALJ does.40 
 
 34 15 U.S.C. § 77u (2012) (“All hearings shall be public and may be held before the 
Commission or an officer or officers of the Commission designated by it . . . .”). 
 35 See 5 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012) (authorizing OPM to “prescribe regulations for, control, 
supervise, and preserve the records of, examinations for the competitive service”).  For an 
in-depth description of the ALJ hiring process, see BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2–6. 
 36 See 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 (1995) (“An agency may appoint an individual to an administrative 
law judge position only with prior approval of OPM, except when it makes its selection 
from the list of eligibles provided by OPM.”); BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2. 
 37 BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2. 
 38 See 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (2012) (“An agency . . . which occasionally or temporarily is 
insufficiently staffed with administrative law judges . . . may use administrative law judges 
selected by the Office of Personnel Management from and with the consent of other 
agencies.”); 5 C.F.R. § 930.208 (1995) (noting that, in accordance with § 3344, “OPM 
administers an Administrative Law Judge Loan Program that coordinates the loan/detail 
of an administrative law judge from one agency to another”). 
 39 See BURROWS, supra note 32, at 2–3 (eumerating the qualifications required to become an 
ALJ); see also NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) 
(Aldisert, J., concurring) (“[T]he selection process for ALJs should inspire more respect 
for this office than is generally extended by Article III judges; it is a process that requires 
rigorous inquiries into the background and competence of the candidates.”); Duka v. 
SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 387 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (commenting that the ALJ at issue 
“ha[d] a distinguished biography”); James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 807, 811–14 & 814 n.43 (1984) 
(discussing that in light of the discretion that ALJs possess and the process by which they 
are selected, among other feaures of their positions, they yield power similar to that of 
Article III judges). 
 40 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-10(a)(2) (1995) (granting the Chief ALJ the authority to “designate 
administrative law judges pursuant to Rule 110 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice”); 
see also Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (noting that the 
SEC had acknowledged that the ALJ at issue in the case was illegally appointed). 
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2. The ALJ Hearing and Appeals Process 
The APA outlines the steps and processes generally available to litigants 
in an agency proceeding.41  SEC ALJs’ authority is as broad as provided for 
by the APA.42  In an agency hearing, an ALJ has the authority to: 
 (1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas;43 (3) Rule 
on offers of proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a 
hearing; (6) Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions; and 
(8) Unless waived by the parties, prepare an initial decision containing 
the conclusions as to the factual and legal issues presented, and issue an 
appropriate order.44 
Following the issuance of an SEC ALJ’s initial decision, a party has a 
right to appeal that decision to the Commissioners,45 who review it de novo.46  
Importantly, even if an initial decision is not appealed or reviewed, it does 
not become final until the Commission “issue[s] an order that the decision 
has become final.”47  Prior to appealing an adverse agency ruling in federal 
court, a party must first appeal to the Commission, since a final order from 
the Commission is a prerequisite to judicial review.48  To appeal a final order 
to a federal court of appeals, a litigant must do so within sixty days.49 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE SEC ENFORCEMENT 
SCHEME 
The SEC’s ability to bring individual in-house enforcement actions has 
prompted numerous protests concerning the fairness and constitutionality 
of permitting the same case to be brought either in-house or in federal 
court.  Litigants steered into in-house hearings complain that the amount of 
process afforded to them diverges considerably from that which a litigant 
 
 41 See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“When the presiding employee makes an initial decision, 
that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without further proceedings unless 
there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time provided by rule.”). 
 42 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111 (1995) (“No provision of these Rules of Practice shall be 
construed to limit the powers of the hearing officer provided by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 43 Although an ALJ may issue a subpoena, he or she is unable to compel compliance; that 
requires a district court order.  15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (2012) (establishing that in cases 
involving a refusal to obey a Commission-issued subpoena, the Commission must seek 
recourse from a federal district court). 
 44 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995). 
 45 Id. §§ 201.360(d), 201.410(a). 
 46 Id. § 201.411(a). 
 47 Id. § 201.360(d)(2). 
 48 Id. § 201.410(e). 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2012). 
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receives in federal court.50  Moreover, even the most complex cases must be 
completed within 300 days of filing.51  Rather than undergo a truncated, 
procedurally incomplete hearing, some have challenged the proceedings in 
federal district court on Due Process and Equal Protection grounds.52    
More recently, litigants have contested ALJs’ authority to adjudicate their 
claims by arguing that ALJs are unconstitutionally shielded from the 
President’s removal power and were not properly appointed under Article 
II’s Appointments Clause.53  Prior to determining the merits of these 
challenges, jurisdiction first must be established, which, this Comment 
contends, at least arguably exists, although no court of appeals to decide the 
issue has found jurisdiction.54 
 
 50 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 23–25, Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 
1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (No. 1:15-cv-01801-LMM) (listing the numerous ways in which 
administrative proceedings differ from civil proceedings in federal district courts). 
 51 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (1995). 
 52 See, e.g., Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alleging a “Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause violation based on the Commission’s supposed prejudgment of their 
charges”); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1500 
(2016) (alleging that Dodd-Frank “provides the SEC ‘unguided’ authority to choose 
which respondents will and which will not receive the procedural protections of a federal 
district court, in violation of equal protection and due process guarantees”); Chau v. SEC, 
72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (alleging that “the SEC’s choice to pursue them 
administratively, as opposed to suing them in a United States District Court, [had] 
deprive[d] them of their rights to due process and equal protection of law”); Altman v. 
SEC, 687 F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Altman contends that the actions of the 
Commission deprived him of equal protection and due process . . . .”); Gupta v. S.E.C., 
796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alleging “that the SEC’s unjustified decision 
to deprive Gupta, alone, of the opportunity to contest these allegations in federal court” 
was “in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); see infra Part IV.A. 
 53 See, e.g., Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alleging that ALJs are 
“insulated unlawfully from oversight by the President”), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 
F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472-RA, 2015 WL 
4006165, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015) (“Tilton I”) (arguing that the appointment of 
SEC ALJs violated Article II’s Appointments Clause), aff’d Tilton II, 824 F.3d; Hill v. SEC, 
114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Hill I”) (asserting “that the proceeding 
violates Article II of the Constitution because ALJs are protected by two layers of tenure 
protection”), rev’d Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”); Gray Fin. Grp., 
Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (alleging “the ALJ’s appointment 
violates the Appointments Clause of Article II”), rev’d sub nom. Hill II, 825 F.3d; Ironridge 
Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (alleging that “the 
ALJ’s appointment violates the Appointments Clause of Article II because he was not 
appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head”); Timbervest, LLC v. 
SEC, No. 1:15-CV-2106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015) (arguing 
that the ALJ at issue was unconstitutionally shielded from removal by the President and 
that he was not properly appointed); Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632, 634 (D. Md. 
2015) (alleging that SEC ALJs are unconstitutionally protected in light of the fact that 
they can only be removed “for good cause”).  For further discussion, see infra Parts II.B & 
II.C. 
 54 See Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1241 (holding that the district court lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction, and asserting that its holding was consistent with those of other circuits). 
530 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
A. Establishing Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Traditionally, a litigant may not seek review of an agency action prior to 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies, provided the agency’s 
authorizing statute requires it.55  Here, some individuals subject to SEC 
proceedings have opted to raise the ALJ appointments issue in agency 
hearings, rather than sue the SEC in federal court, thereby avoiding this 
jurisdictional issue.  In In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., the SEC Commissioners—
mirroring the SEC’s position in federal court—found (not surprisingly) that 
there was no Appointments Clause violation, since ALJs are not inferior 
officers.56  Two Commissioners dissented.57  The D.C. Circuit similarly found 
no Appointments Clause violation.58 
However, most plaintiffs who have raised Appointments Clause 
challenges opted to sue the SEC in federal district court.59  Since the 
challenged proceedings stem from an agency whose authorizing statute 
provides for exclusive remedies to an adversely effected party,60 a federal 
court first must determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction to 
resolve the claim prior to the exhaustion of those remedies.61  Although the 
Supreme Court has not addressed whether jurisdiction exists, the D.C. and 
Seventh Circuits found no jurisdiction, although no Appointments Clause 
challenges were raised in these cases.62  However,  Appointments Clause 
challenges were raised in the Second, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits.  The 
 
 55 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006) (internal citation omitted) (“The doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the jurisprudence of 
administrative law.”) 
 56 Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 75837, 2015 WL 5172953, at *2, 23 
(Sept. 3, 2015). 
 57 See Public Statement, SEC, Opinion of Commissioner Gallagher and Commissioner 
Piwowar, Dissenting from the Opinion of the Commission (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/dissenting-opinion-gallagher-piwowar.html  (“Even 
though the Commission is free to express its views on Constitutional issues, we recognize 
and believe it is appropriate that Article III federal judges ultimately resolve this issue.”). 
 58 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 280, 289, 296 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 59  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 53. 
 60 See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012) (“A person aggrieved by a final order of the Commission 
entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review in the United States Court of 
Appeals.”). 
 61 See generally Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); see also Sims v. 
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000) (“Where the parties are expected to develop the issues in 
an adversarial administrative proceeding, it seems to us that the rationale for requiring 
issue exhaustion is at its greatest.”); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969) 
(“[I]t is normally desirable to let the agency develop the necessary factual background 
upon which decisions should be based. . . . The courts ordinarily should not interfere 
with an agency until it has completed its action, or else has clearly exceeded its 
jurisdiction.”). 
 62 See generally Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765 (7th 
Cir. 2015). 
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Second and Eleventh Circuits found no jurisdiction, and an appeal before 
the Fourth Circuit is still pending.63  The Fourth Circuit declined to stay 
agency proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal.64 
When gauging the persuasiveness of the decisions that ruled on the 
jurisdictional question, it is helpful to distinguish between those cases that 
have raised Appointments Clause challenges and those that have not.  The 
former cases more convincingly can claim to be wholly collateral to the 
agency hearing and outside its scope of expertise, as I argue below. 
Courts have been less willing to find jurisdiction in cases that lack an 
Appointments Clause challenge.65  Courts have ruled that jurisdiction does 
not exist in cases raising Due Process or Equal Protection challenges because 
they are not collateral to the suit or outside the scope of the SEC’s expertise, 
and “a finding of preclusion does not foreclose all meaningful judicial 
review,”66 since an appellate court can remand the case if it finds that Due 
Process was not afforded.67 
Beginning in mid-2015,68 SEC litigants regularly challenged the 
constitutionality of the ALJs’ appointments, which some district courts have 
 
 63 See generally Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”); Notice of Appeal, Bennett v. SEC, 2016 WL 7321231 
(4th Cir. Dec. 21, 2015) (No. 15-2584). 
 64 Order, Bennett, 2016 WL 7321231, (No. 15-2584) (“Upon consideration . . . the court 
denies the motion to expedite and for injunctive relief pending appeal.”). 
 65 See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 20–22 (noting that, unlike in Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010), plaintiff “would not have to erect a 
Trojan-horse challenge to an SEC rule or ‘bet the farm’ by subjecting himself to 
unnecessary sanction under the securities laws” and that his claims concerned 
“substantive or procedural deficiencies in the Commission’s enforcement of the securities 
laws against him,” which were not collateral to the proceeding); Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775 
(“We see no evidence from the statute’s text, structure, and purpose that Congress 
intended for plaintiffs like Bebo who are already subject to ongoing administrative 
enforcement proceedings to be able to stop those proceedings by challenging the 
constitutionality of the enabling legislation or the structural authority of the SEC.”); Chau 
v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“This Court’s jurisdiction is not an 
escape hatch for litigants to delay or derail an administrative action when statutory 
channels of review are entirely adequate.”).  But see Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 
513–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim on the 
grounds that the complaint “would state a claim even if Gupta were entirely guilty of the 
charges made against him” because his claims were wholly collateral to the underlying 
insider trading allegations). 
 66 Bebo, 799 F.3d at 767. 
 67 See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 22 (“[S]hould the record in the administrative proceeding prove 
inadequate to the court of appeals considering his attacks on the Commission’s final 
order, that court always has the option of remanding to the agency for further factual 
development.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68 Allison Frankel, Skadden’s New Theory on Why SEC In-House Judges Are Unconstitutional, 
REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/04/02/skaddens-
new-theory-on-why-sec-in-house-judges-are-unconstitutional. 
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found sufficient to establish jurisdiction.69  Because the Appointments 
Clause challenge is less clearly connected to any aspect of the underlying 
substantive claims, it has a stronger argument that the issue is not one 
Congress intended to limit from a district court’s jurisdiction.  Indeed, the 
plaintiff in Hill v. SEC tried to raise the challenge before an ALJ, but the ALJ 
ruled that he lacked the authority to rule on it and, as such, the plaintiff was 
forced either to wait for a final ruling—without the chance to have his 
constitutional challenge heard—or to seek an injunction in federal court.70  
Further, appellate review of a final SEC order offers no relief, since, as 
plaintiffs argue, they “will have already suffered an irreparable injury by the 
time he gets to the Court of Appeals on account of enduring an 
unconstitutional administrative hearing.”71 
In Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, the Supreme Court discussed several 
considerations that are useful in determining whether Congress intended to 
foreclose district court jurisdiction over a collateral constitutional challenge 
or to allow a litigant to bypass the administrative process.72  As instructed in 
Thunder Basin, a court may assume that Congress did not intend to limit 
jurisdiction if “a finding of preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial 
review,” if the issue is “‘wholly collateral’ to a statute’s review provisions,” 
and if the substance of the claim lies “outside the agency’s expertise.”73  The 
Court also emphasized that “[w]hether a statute is intended to preclude 
initial judicial review is determined from the statute’s language, structure, 
and purpose.”74 
The Court recently employed this test in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board and in Elgin v. Department of the Treasury,75 
separating the considerations into three distinct factors.76  The reasoning 
employed in both cases is instructive in trying to determine how the Court 
 
 69 See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1305–10 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Hill I”) (finding the 
plaintiff’s Appointments Clause claim gave rise to subject-matter jurisdiction because the 
plaintiff did not merely challenge the propriety of the SEC’s decision, but disputed the 
SEC’s constitutional authority). 
 70 Brief of Appellee at 4, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”) (No. 15-
12831). 
 71 Id. at 16; cf. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976) (holding that jurisdiction is 
proper where the “constitutional challenge is entirely collateral to [the] substantive claim 
of entitlement”). 
 72 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207–18 (1994). 
 73 Id. at 212–13. 
 74 Id. at 207. 
 75 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010); Elgin v. 
Dep’t of the Treasury,132 S. Ct. 2126, 2133–36 (2012). 
 76 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010). 
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would rule in the matter of the SEC’s ALJs.  Tilton v. SEC and Hill also 
referenced these cases to help them decide this issue.77 
1. Meaningful Judicial Review 
Meaningful judicial review is the most difficult factor on which to predict 
how the Court would rule and likely would determine the outcome of the 
challenge.  As in Free Enterprise, the appeals statute in question is 15 U.S.C. § 
78y.78  In Free Enterprise, the Court ruled that no meaningful judicial review 
existed.79  There, petitioners were subject to an investigation, but the 
PCAOB ultimately did not issue any sanctions.80  As such, there was no 
opportunity to challenge its constitutionality.81  The Court rejected the 
government’s argument that the plaintiffs lacked jurisdiction because they 
needed to wait for an adverse ruling.82  The Court ruled that no “meaningful 
avenue of relief” exists where a plaintiff must “bet the farm . . . by taking the 
violative action before testing the validity of the law.”83 
The case of the SEC’s ALJs is distinguishable from Free Enterprise because, 
here, the SEC already had initiated enforcement actions against each 
plaintiff.  Thus, the only measurable harm the current plaintiffs would incur 
by having to first undergo an agency proceeding is the expense of litigation, 
which is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.84  Moreover, as the Second 
Circuit noted in Tilton II, “some—but not all—of the PCAOB’s regulatory 
actions required SEC approval in the form of a final Commission order.”85 
Thus not all PCAOB action was subject to the appeals process described 
under § 78y, which only covers Commission orders.86  This is seemingly 
distinguishable from the present case where every ALJ decision is subject to 
review by the Commission and, ultimately, a federal court of appeals. 
Plaintiffs also cite to McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center for the proposition 
that just because a statute requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
that does not necessarily mean that the act encompasses “general collateral 
 
 77 See generally Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”); Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 
1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”). 
 78 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 489; Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1242. 
 79 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 490–91 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84 See Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (“Mere litigation 
expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable 
injury.”). 
 85  Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 283 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”). 
 86 Id. 
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challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies.”87  However, McNary is 
factually distinguishable from the present cases and is more closely 
analogous to Free Enterprise.  In McNary, undocumented workers sought to 
challenge the denial of special worker status, but the agency only permitted 
challenges to that classification in deportation hearings, which would force 
individuals to “surrender themselves for deportation” in order to obtain a 
decision.88  That is akin to having to “bet the farm by taking the violative 
action,” which, under Free Enterprise, is not an avenue for meaningful 
review.89 
Here, the Eleventh Circuit and a divided Second Circuit held that there 
was an opportunity for meaningful review,90 which the latter referred to as 
“the ‘most important’ Thunder Basin factor.”91  These two courts disagreed 
with district courts that had reasoned that no meaningful review existed 
because litigants would still be required to undergo the very hearing whose 
constitutionality they were challenging and they would have already suffered 
the alleged harm, regardless of the outcome of the proceeding or a later 
appeal.92  The Tilton dissent agreed that no meaningful review existed and 
also noted that because most claims end in settlement, “it might well be that 
choosing to litigate is, in fact, equivalent to ‘betting the farm.’”93 
In reversing the lower courts, these Circuit Courts relied on Elgin to 
support that no jurisdiction exists.94  However, Elgin, like Free Enterprise, is 
distinguishable.  In Elgin, the Court found that a district court lacked 
jurisdiction because review was available in the Federal Circuit.95  Under the 
Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), federal employees are permitted to 
“obtain administrative and judicial review of specified adverse employment 
actions.”96  Following a hearing before an ALJ,97 any employee “against 
 
 87 See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 21, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”) 
(No. 15-12831) (quoting McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991)). 
 88 McNary, 498 U.S. at 496–97. 
 89 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 490–91 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 90 Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1250; Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 283, 87. 
 91 Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 282 (quoting Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 774–75 (7th Cir. 2015)).  
 92 See Gray Fin. Grp. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Because the 
courts of appeals cannot enjoin an unconstitutional administrative proceeding which has 
already occurred, those claims would be moot and the meaningful review Thunder Basin 
contemplates would be missing.”); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“Simply put, there would be no proceeding to enjoin.”). 
 93 Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 298 n.5 (2d. Cir. 2016) (Droney, J., dissenting) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 94  Id. at 279, 287–91 (majority opinion) (agreeing with the district court below when it “re-
lied in part on Elgin” to determine that it lacked jurisdiction and citing Elgin in deciding 
two of the three Thunder Basin factors). 
 95 Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2139 (2012). 
 96 Id. at 2130. 
 97 Id. at 2131. 
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whom an action is taken” may obtain internal review and, if “aggrieved by a 
final order,” may appeal exclusively to the Federal Circuit.98  In Elgin, 
petitioners were former federal employees who were fired for failing to 
comply with the Military Selective Service Act and as a result, were statutorily 
barred from federal employment in executive agencies.99  Due to this 
absolute statutory bar on federal employment, the ALJ dismissed the claim 
for lack of jurisdiction.100  Petitioners then sought a declaratory judgment in 
district court rather than challenge the ruling before the Merit Systems 
Protection Board (“MSPB”) or in the Federal Circuit.101  Elgin held that 
meaningful review was available in the Federal Circuit, “an Article III court 
fully competent to adjudicate petitioners’ claims that Section 3328 and the 
Military Selective Service Act’s registration requirement are 
unconstitutional.”102 
Unlike Elgin, the challenge here is not to any SEC ALJ decision, but to 
the constitutionality of the proceeding itself, in light of the ALJ’s defective 
appointment.  By contrast, in Elgin, petitioners challenged an ALJ’s 
determination that he lacked jurisdiction and they were arguing that the 
ALJ should hear their claims.  If, on appeal, the Federal Circuit had found 
that jurisdiction existed, petitioners would not have contested the agency 
proceeding.  Thus, there are ways to distinguish Free Enterprise, McNary and 
Elgin and a colorable argument exists for both sides.  Nonetheless, it is not 
clear that litigants have met the high bar needed to establish that 
meaningful review does not exist.  In sum, “post-proceeding relief, although 
imperfect, suffices to vindicate the litigant’s constitutional claim”103 since a 
court of appeals can “vacate a Commission order in whole, relieving the 
respondents of any liability.”104  Ultimately, it is uncertain how the Court will 
rule. 
2. Wholly Collateral 
The Court is likely to find that the Appointments Clause challenge is 
wholly collateral to the underlying SEC action.  In Free Enterprise, the Court 
held that a wholly collateral attack not challenging any particular agency 
 
 98 Id. at 2134. 
 99 Id. at 2131. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 2137. 
103 Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d. 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”).  But see id. at 299 (Droney, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that Free Enterprise “considers the very process of enforcement by an 
unconstitutional body to be an injury that can be relevant to the determination of 
whether post-proceeding review is ‘meaningful’”). 
104 Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1247 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
78y(a)(3)). 
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ruling may be brought prior to the exhaustion of administrative remedies.105  
The Court rejected the government’s argument that plaintiffs could have 
and should have challenged in an agency hearing the PCAOB’s “auditing 
standards, registration requirements, or other rules,” since the objection was 
“to the Board’s existence, not to any of its auditing standards.”106  In Elgin, 
the challenge was not wholly collateral because the “petitioners’ 
constitutional claims are the vehicle by which they seek to reverse the 
removal decisions, to return to federal employment, and to receive the 
compensation,” which “is precisely the type of personnel action regularly 
adjudicated by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA 
scheme.”107  Here, as in Free Enterprise, the challengers object to the very 
existence of the proceeding, not to any specific decision or rule, which is a 
wholly collateral issue. 
Hill held that that this factor and the next “do not cut strongly either 
way,”108 whereas Tilton held that “a claim is not wholly collateral if it has been 
raised in response to, and so is procedurally intertwined with, an 
administrative proceeding—regardless of the claim’s substantive connection 
to the initial merits dispute.”109  However, as the Tilton dissent persuasively 
argued, the majority improperly focused on the procedural—rather than the 
substantive—merits of the constitutional claim, which runs contrary to the 
Court’s analysis in Thunder Basin, Free Enterprise, and Elgin.110  The dissent 
further noted that if—as the majority held—no challenge that could end an 
ongoing agency proceeding could ever be considered wholly collateral, that 
interpretation “would swallow the rule, for there would no longer be any 
need to evaluate the substance of a claim as long as the claim could 
somehow serve to end administrative proceedings in a plaintiff’s favor.”111  
Unlike Elgin, where the claim related to the substance of the act itself, here, 
the Appointments Clause claim has nothing to do with the enforcement of 
securities law and is wholly collateral. 
3. Outside the Agency’s Expertise 
The Court is also likely to find that this challenge is outside the SEC’s 
expertise.  The Appointments Clause claim—unlike a ruling on a subpoena 
 
105 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489 (2010) 
(“The Government [incorrectly] reads § 78y as an exclusive route to review.”). 
106 Id. at 490. 
107 Elgin, 132 S. Ct. at 2139–40. 
108 Hill II, 825 F.3d at 1250. 
109 Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 287 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”). 
110 Id. at 292 (Droney, J., dissenting). 
111 Id. at 295. 
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or a discovery motion, among others112—is not within the SEC’s expertise of 
investigating securities fraud or insider trading allegations, as even courts 
that found no jurisdiction have held.113  Rather, “the statutory questions 
involved do not require ‘technical considerations of [agency] policy’ [and] 
are instead standard questions of administrative law.”114  Tilton and Hill held 
that the SEC could bring its general expertise to bear by finding that no 
securities violation occurred, which would moot the Appointments Clause 
claim.115  But that reasoning is unconvincing, since it ignores the merits of 
the underlying challenge and focuses only on the merits of the securities 
claim with no clear basis that that interpretation is consistent with Supreme 
Court precedent. 
4. Weighing the Thunder Basin Factors 
To date, no court has ruled on how much weight to give each Thunder 
Basin factor, which will be necessary if the factors are not decided the same 
way.116  If, as Tilton and Hill argue, the meaningful judicial review factor is 
the most important, the Court may find no jurisdiction.  If, however, they 
are to be weighed equally, then jurisdiction may exist. 
B. Determining Whether SEC ALJs Are Inferior Officers 
This section addresses whether ALJs are inferior officers or mere 
employees, since the Appointments Clause is only relevant if they are 
inferior officers.  Because the SEC readily concedes that it does not appoint 
its ALJs,117 if SEC ALJs are inferior officers—as this Comment argues they 
may be—then their appointments violate the Appointments Clause. 
The Constitution states that the President:  
 
112 Cf. Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[The plaintiffs’] due process 
claim has been that the SEC’s procedural rules . . . are unfair in light of the facts and 
circumstances of [their] case.”) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
113 See Tilton v. SEC, No. 15-CV-2472-RA, 2015 WL 4006165, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2015) 
(“Tilton I”) (“[T]he particular constitutional questions here may not be within the SEC’s 
expertise.”). 
114 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 (2010) 
(quoting Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) (first alteration in original)).  
115 Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236, 1250 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Hill II”); Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 
290 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Tilton II”). 
116 Cf. Tilton II, 824 F.3d at 299 (Droney, J., dissenting) (“I am unpersuaded that the 
‘meaningful judicial review’ prong has enough weight to overpower the other two factors 
and result in a finding of no jurisdiction.”) 
117 See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The Commission 
has acknowledged the ALJ was not appointed as the Clause requires . . . .”). 
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shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments . . . shall be established by Law; but the Congress may by 
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.118   
In Free Enterprise, the Court held that “[b]ecause the Commission [SEC] 
is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not subordinate to or 
contained within any other such component, it constitutes a ‘Department’ 
for the purposes of the Appointments Clause.”119  Even assuming ALJs are 
inferior officers, had the Commissioners appointed its ALJs there would be 
no constitutional infirmity; however, the SEC does not, in fact, appoint its 
ALJs. 
Officers exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United 
States.”120  The President appoints principal officers “with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.”121  The difference between an inferior officer and a 
principal officer has not been fully clarified,122 but the distinction is not 
crucial for this Comment.  That is because ALJs’ initial decisions are 
reviewed de novo by the Commissioners, thus ALJs are at most inferior 
officers.  Of note, “Heads of Departments” may appoint inferior officers.123  
By contrast, “[e]mployees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers,” 
and may be hired in any manner the agency decides.124 
In Free Enterprise, the dissent listed positions that the Supreme Court has 
previously found to be inferior officers.125  Although the majority 
sidestepped whether ALJs are inferior officers,126 the dissent argued that 
 
118 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
119 561 U.S. at 511 (internal alteration omitted); see also Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ 
Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797, 810 (2013) (noting that not all executive agencies are 
also departments). 
120 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). 
121 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
122 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997) (“Our cases have not set forth an 
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers . . . .”); Nick 
Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?  The Court’s New Appointments Clause 
Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1114 (1998) (“Early Supreme Court attempts to 
define the term ‘officer’ provide inexact, if any, judicially manageable standards.”). 
123 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
124 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162. 
125 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 540 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had previously held that “officers” included 
a district court clerk, clerks in various executive departments, an assistant treasurer’s 
clerk, an assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, United States attorneys, 
federal marshals, military judges, Article I judges, and the Department of 
Transportation’s general counsel, among others). 
126 See id. at 507 n.10 (“[O]ur holding . . . does not address that subset of independent 
agency employees who serve as administrative law judges. . . . Whether administrative law 
judges are necessarily ‘Officers of the United States’ is disputed.”) (majority opinion). 
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“[r]eading the criteria above as stringently as possible, I still see no way to 
avoid sweeping hundreds, perhaps thousands of high-level Government 
officials within the scope of the Court’s holding, putting their job security 
and their administrative actions and decisions constitutionally at risk.”127 
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court attempted to delineate certain 
factors that are relevant to determine an individual’s constitutional status.  
The Court held that no Appointments Clause violation existed with respect 
to an independent counsel who was appointed by a “Court[] of Law”128 to 
investigate and prosecute high-ranking government officials, since she was 
an inferior officer—not a principal officer—and did not need to be 
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.129  To determine an 
officer’s status, the Supreme Court identified four core factors to consider: 
removability by a higher executive branch official; empowerment to perform 
only limited duties; limited jurisdiction; and limited tenure.130  However, the 
Court did not apply the factors, stating that “[w]e need not attempt here to 
decide exactly where the line falls between the two types of officers, because 
in our view appellant clearly falls on the ‘inferior officer’ side of that line.”131 
Less than ten years later, in Edmond v. United States, the Court returned to 
this issue and defined an inferior officer as one “whose work is directed and 
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential 
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”132  The Court ruled 
that Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges were inferior officers, 
since, among other reasons, the Judge Advocate General and the Court of 
Appeals for the Armed Forces supervised them.133 
Unlike Morrison and Edmond, which differentiated between principal and 
inferior officers, Freytag v. Commissioner134 distinguished between an inferior 
officer and an employee and focused on the “degree of authority exercised” 
and, secondarily, on the ability to render a final decision.135  In Raymond J. 
Lucia Cos. v. SEC,136 the D.C. Circuit became the first appellate court to apply 
this test to SEC ALJs.  However, Lucia created its own test for who is an 
inferior officer that, this Comment argues, is not entirely consistent with the 
 
127 Id. at 540–41 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
128 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
129 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671, 676 (1988). 
130 Bravin, supra note 122, at 1116 (citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72). 
131 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.  Indeed, the dissent criticized this lack of guidance and its 
failure to consider the separation-of-powers concerns that would arise from the decision.  
Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
132 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997). 
133 Id. at 664, 666. 
134 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
135 Id. at 880–82. 
136 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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test articulated by the Supreme Court in Freytag.  Lucia stated that “the main 
criteria for drawing the line between inferior Officers and employees not 
covered by the Clause are (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the 
officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) 
the finality of those decisions.”137  However, Freytag placed a greater emphasis 
on the first two factors only.138 
1. ALJs Wield Considerable Discretion 
In Freytag, the Court determined that Tax Court Special Trial Judges 
(“STJs”), who could be appointed by the Tax Court Chief Judge and who 
were tasked with assisting Tax Court judges, were inferior officers.139  The 
Court reasoned that STJs were inferior officers because “the degree of 
authority exercised . . . [was] so significant that it was inconsistent with the 
classification of lesser functionaries or employees.”140  Although the 
government argued that STJs “lack[ed] authority to enter a final decision” in 
certain cases, the Court found that “this argument ignores the significance 
of the duties and discretion that special trial judges possess.”141  The Court 
noted that “[t]he office of special trial judge is established by Law,” and that 
STJs “perform more than ministerial tasks.  They take testimony, conduct 
trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce 
compliance with discovery orders.  In the course of carrying out these 
important functions, the special trial judges exercise significant 
discretion.”142 
In Landry v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., the D.C. Circuit applied Freytag 
to address whether Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) ALJs 
are inferior officers.143  The court recognized that, like Freytag’s STJs, an 
ALJ’s position is “established by Law, as are its specific duties, salary, and 
means of appointment.”144  Further, ALJs also “take testimony, conduct trials, 
rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to enforce 
compliance with discovery orders . . . [and] exercise significant 
discretion.”145 
 
137 Id. at 285 (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). 
138 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. 
139 Id. 880–82. 
140 Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 881–82 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
143 204 F.3d 1125, 1130–32 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
144 Id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145 Id. at 1134 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. 881–82); see also 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995) 
(denoting the power that ALJs have when conducting agencies hearings); Barnett, supra 
note 119, at 811–12 (describing the powers that ALJs yield). 
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Although Landry ultimately held that ALJs are not inferior officers, there 
are reasons both to distinguish between SEC ALJs and FDIC ALJs and to 
question whether Landry was correctly decided, as discussed in more detail 
in the next subsection. 
Landry recognized that FDIC ALJs wield considerable authority, similar 
to that exercised by STJs.  Nonetheless, it distinguished between STJs and 
ALJs, reasoning that STJs could sometimes render final decisions, whereas 
ALJs could issue only “recommended findings of fact” and “recommended 
conclusions of law.”146  Further, Landry noted that an STJ’s factual findings 
cannot be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous, whereas FDIC ALJs’ 
factual findings are reviewed de novo.147 
Unlike the Landry majority, the concurrence argued that “[t]here are no 
relevant differences” between the functions of ALJs and STJs, recognizing 
that the Supreme Court did not make rendering final decisions a necessary 
condition for inferior officer status.148  Like STJs, ALJs are established by 
law149 and wield considerable authority and discretion,150 which, it argued, 
was a more important consideration to the Freytag Court.151 
SEC ALJs wield significant power—inconsistent with that of an 
employee—and they decide important agency matters.  They  
(1) Administer oaths and affirmations; (2) Issue subpoenas; (3) Rule on 
offers of proof; (4) Examine witnesses; (5) Regulate the course of a 
hearing; (6) Hold pre-hearing conferences; (7) Rule upon motions; and 
(8) . . . prepare an initial decision containing the conclusions as to the 
factual and legal issues presented, and issue an appropriate order.152   
Because SEC ALJs exercise comparable discretion with respect to STJs, they 
satisfy the first two Lucia elements that were focal to Freytag’s holding.153  
Thus, it is arguable that they, too, are inferior officers. 
Notably, the D.C. Circuit in Lucia, relying largely on Landry, held that 
SEC ALJs are not inferior officers.154  However, that court did not devote 
significant space to the issue of ALJ discretion.  Rather, much of its analysis 
 
146 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. (citing Tax Ct. R. 183(c)). 
148 Id. at 1141 (Randolph, J., concurring). 
149 17 C.F.R. § 200.14 (1995). 
150 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“[T]he role of the 
modern . . . administrative law judge . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.”); 
see also Barnett, supra note 119, at 798 (noting that the function of ALJs “closely parallels 
that of Article III judges”). 
151    Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (“It is true that the Supreme Court relied on this consideration; 
the last paragraph of the opinion quoted above indicates as much. What the majority 
neglects to mention is that the Court clearly designated this as an alternative holding.”) 
152 17 C.F.R. § 200.14(a) (1995). 
153 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
154 See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Landry is the law of 
the circuit.”). 
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focused on the finality issue and the scope of the Commission’s review, 
which are discussed in the following section. 
2. That ALJs’ Decisions Lack Finality and Are Reviewed De Novo Is Not 
Dispositive of Whether They Are Inferior Officers 
An adjudicator may still be an inferior officer even if his or her decisions 
are reviewed de novo and the decisions are not summarily final.  Moreover, 
they are not required elements, contrary to Lucia’s reading of Freytag. 
a.  Finality Is Not a Required Element of Inferior Officer Status 
In Freytag, the Court buttressed its conclusion that STJs were inferior 
officers by noting that even if STJs’ duties “under subsection (b)(4) were not 
as significant as we . . . have found them to be, our conclusion would be 
unchanged[,]” since under other parts of the statutory scheme, “the Chief 
Judge may assign [STJs] to render the decisions of the Tax Court.”155  Thus, 
even for the hearings over which an STJ could not render a final decision 
and for which he was a “mere employee with respect to [those] 
responsibilities,” that did not “transform his status [as an inferior officer] 
under the Constitution.”156  While suggesting that final decision-making 
authority may be sufficient to make someone an inferior officer, this dictum 
does not suggest that finality is necessary. 
The Supreme Court in Freytag focused first and foremost on “the 
significance of the duties and discretion” that STJs exercised, as did the 
Landry concurrence.157  The Landry concurrence emphasized that an ALJ’s 
discretion and authority—not its ability to render final decisions—is central 
to the determination that an ALJ is an inferior officer, and the fact that its 
decisions are reviewed by the agency “shows only that the ALJ shares the 
common characteristic of an ‘inferior Officer.’”158  Accordingly, it appears—
as some commenters have argued—that the Landry concurrence “had the 
better argument,”159 and that final decision making authority, although 
highly relevant, is not dispositive.  The Landry majority’s reading of Freytag 
and its reliance on Freytag’s dictum seem misplaced.160 
 
155 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 881. 
158 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring). 
159 Barnett, supra note 119, at 813. 
160 Indeed, this reading of Freytag is inconsistent with Edmond, which held that a judge was an 
inferior officer even though he “ha[d] no power to render a final decision . . . unless 
permitted to do so by other Executive officers.”  520 U.S. 651, 665 (1997).  Although Free 
Enterprise mentioned Landry, it declined to follow or reject it, simply citing it for the 
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Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit in Landry emphasized the fact that STJs 
could render final decisions in delineated instances and used that to 
distinguish them from FDIC ALJs,161 ignoring the central part of Freytag’s 
holding.  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit in Lucia emphasized the lack of finality 
in its determination that SEC ALJs are not inferior officers.162 
Even if Landry was correctly decided, SEC ALJs arguably can be 
distinguished from FDIC ALJs.  FDIC ALJs render “recommendary 
decisions,” which “always require further agency action.”163  By contrast, in 
certain instances an SEC ALJ’s decision can become the final agency 
decision.164  Although this distinction appears compelling, the court in Lucia 
dismissed it, finding that “the difference between the FDIC’s recommended 
decisions and the Commission’s initial decisions is illusory.”165  It further 
stressed that the SEC “has retained full decision-making powers” and that an 
ALJ’s initial decision becomes final “when, and only when, the Commission 
issues the finality order.”166  Thus, ALJs do not have the power “to act 
independently of the Commission, nor . . . do they have the power to bind 
third parties.”167  However, Lucia’s holding too quickly dismisses the fact that 
the SEC has the discretion to decline to review a decision in which there is 
no clearly erroneous factual or legal conclusion, unlike the FDIC.168  This 
suggests that there is some meaningful distinction between the finality of an 
SEC ALJ’s decision and that of an FDIC ALJ’s. 
b.  The SEC’s Scope of Review over an ALJ’s Decision Does Not 
Render ALJs Employees 
Additionally, the scope of review was not focal to Freytag’s inferior officer 
analysis.  Nonetheless, Landry distinguished the scope and depth of review 
for STJ and ALJ non-final decisions to support its holding that ALJs are not 
 
proposition that whether ALJs are inferior officers was “disputed.”  561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 
(2010). 
161 See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (arguing that “in another way the [Supreme] Court laid 
exceptional stress on the STJs’ final decisionmaking power”). 
162 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 284–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
163 Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, 1:15–CV–2106–LMM, 2015 WL 7597428, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 
4, 2015) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012)). 
164 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (1995) (“If a party or aggrieved person entitled to review fails 
to file timely a petition for review or a motion to correct a manifest error of fact in the 
initial decision, and if the Commission does not order review of a decision on its own 
initiative, the Commission will issue an order that the decision has become final as to that 
party.”); see 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(e) (1995) (stating that for ALJ decisions not subject to 
mandatory review, “the Commission may summarily affirm an initial decision”). 
165 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
166 Id. at 286. 
167 Id. 
168 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(b)(2) (1995). 
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inferior officers.  Landry noted that, under the Tax Court rules, when 
reviewing an STJ’s recommendation, “[d]ue regard shall be given to the 
circumstance that the [STJ] had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility 
of witnesses, and the findings of fact recommended by the [STJ] shall be 
presumed to be correct.”169  Landry also cited to Edmond, where the Court 
determined that military judges were inferior officers because “so long as 
there is some competent evidence . . . to establish each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces will not reevaluate the facts,” suggesting a very narrow scope of 
review.170  By contrast, the FDIC Board may review “the entire record of the 
proceeding.”171  Here, the SEC Commission may set aside an initial decision 
based on “its judgment [of what is] proper and on the basis of the record,” 
which suggests a less deferential standard of review than in Freytag.172  As 
Lucia also noted, “[i]n either the FDIC or [SEC] system, issues of law and 
fact can go unreviewed,” which supports the SEC’s position that there is not 
as great a difference between the FDIC and SEC as has been argued.173  
However, Landry and Lucia’s emphasis on the scope of review arguably is 
misplaced, given that it was not a focal part of Freytag’s analysis and, indeed, 
was not even relevant to the Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari.174 
Moreover, the FDIC and SEC scope of review can be distinguished.  
Unlike the FDIC, the SEC does not review each initial decision de novo.  
Rather, it exercises discretion over how much and how searching a review to 
conduct.175  The SEC may summarily affirm an initial decision if it believes 
that no further consideration is necessary, at which point the ALJ’s decision 
becomes the SEC’s final order.176  Nonetheless, Lucia argued that the SEC’s 
“scope of review is no more deferential than that of the FDIC Board.”177  But 
unlike the SEC, the FDIC must review all FDIC ALJ decisions, whereas, 
approximately 90% of the SEC’s ALJs’ initial decisions in 2014 and 2015 
were not reviewed by the Commission.178  That SEC hearings may be 
 
169 Tax Ct. R. 183. 
170 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665 (1997). 
171 12 C.F.R. § 308.40(c)(1) (1995) (cited in Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
172 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a) (1995). 
173 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 287–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
174 See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 874 n.3 (1991) (noting that the standard of review 
was “not relevant to [the Court’s] grant of certiorari”). 
175 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(a)–(d) (1995). 
176 Id. § 201.411(e). 
177 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 288. 
178 Brief of Appellants at 30–31, Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(No. 15-1345). 
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presided over by either ALJs or the Commission further exemplifies the 
power ALJs possess.179 
Further, it is not clear that the distinction concerning the scope of review 
necessarily renders an ALJ a mere employee.  As the Court held in Edmond, 
agency adjudicators can be inferior officers even if they “have no power to 
render a final decision.”180  Accordingly, the Landry concurrence found the 
different scope of review to be “no distinction at all,” opining that review by 
a principal officer would merely render FDIC ALJs inferior officers.181  
Nonetheless, Lucia—like Landry—stressed that ALJs operate under the 
control of their agencies and were intended to be accountable to their 
agencies.182  But the mere fact that ALJs operate under the control of an 
Officer does not determine whether they are employees or inferior officers. 
Importantly, even where review is de novo, deference is still given to an 
ALJ’s credibility determination.183  In general, when an agency reviews a 
hearing officer’s decision, it defers to the officer’s credibility findings unless 
the statute or regulation provides otherwise.184  Such a determination can be 
 
179 See 15 U.S.C. § 77u (2012) (“All hearings . . . may be held before the Commission or an 
officer or officers of the Commission designated by it.”); 17 C.F.R. § 201.101(a)(5) (1995) 
(“Hearing officer means an administrative law judge, a panel of Commissioners 
constituting less than a quorum of the Commission, [or] an individual Commissioner.”).  
As the Hill brief noted, the SEC’s website used to refer to ALJs as “independent judicial 
officers.”  See Brief of Appellee at 42 n.15, Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(No. 15-12831) (quoting SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
http://www.sec.gov/alj).  Interestingly, that description has since been modified and now 
defines ALJs as “independent adjudicators.”  SEC, Office of Administrative Law Judges, 
http://www.sec.gov/alj (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).  On the other hand, the SEC states 
that the use of the term “hearing officer” does not mean Congress intended ALJs to be 
“Officers of the United States.”  See Brief of Appellee at 41–42 n.7, Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 
276 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Tilton II”) (No. 15-2103).  The D.C. Circuit agreed.  See Lucia, 832 
F.3d at 289 (noting that the statutory reference to “‘officers of the Commission’ in 15 
U.S.C. § 77u” does not mean that “Congress intended these officers to be synonymous 
with ‘Officers of the United States’ under the Appointments Clause”).  This argument 
seems compelling, since the APA refers to one who renders an initial decision as a 
“presiding employee.”  See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, & 557 (2012). 
180 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 665 (1997).  In keeping with this test, the 
Supreme Court in Ryder v. United States noted that appellate military judges were inferior 
officers.  515 U.S. 177, 180 (1995). 
181 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring). 
182 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 288–89. 
183 See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 n.3 (Randolph, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[d]e novo 
review does not mean that the ALJ’s recommended decisions are without influence”). 
184 See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (stating that when the 
factfinder and the reviewing body reach opposite conclusions on a witness’s credibility, 
deference should be given to “an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the 
witnesses and lived with the case [and] has drawn conclusions different from the 
Board’s”); Bosma v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 754 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
where “credibility is at issue or when findings of motive or purpose depend entirely on 
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overcome “only where the record contains substantial evidence for doing 
so.”185  Indeed, the SEC itself has stated that it defers to its ALJs’ credibility 
findings “absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”186  Further, in 
instances where mandatory review is not guaranteed, the Commission may 
decline review where there is no clearly erroneous factual finding or legal 
conclusion.187  Thus, like Freytag, if there are some instances where ALJs’ 
decisions are final, that may make them inferior officers in all aspects of 
their job. 
In fact, the Landry concurrence noted that magistrate judges perform 
similar functions to ALJs and that “[w]hen there is an objection to a 
magistrate’s findings and recommendations, the district judge—like the 
FDIC—must conduct de novo review,” but “[n]onetheless, it has long been 
settled that federal magistrates are ‘inferior Officers.’”188  Thus, although 
ALJs’ decisions are reviewed de novo, they still may qualify as inferior officer, 
as do magistrates. 
With that said, there is a distinction between the deference given to STJ 
decisions and those ALJ decisions that are subject to review.  “[F]actfindings 
contained in [an STJ’s] report shall be presumed to be correct,”189 whereas if 
SEC Commissioners do not agree on a disposition, “the initial decision shall 
be of no effect.”190  Lucia emphasized this in reaching its ultimate 
conclusion, and the degree to which this matters may influence the outcome 
of the Court’s analysis. 
Lastly, four of the eight current Supreme Court justices have suggested 
that ALJs are inferior officers.191  This is a close issue and it is not entirely 
predictable which way the Court might rule.  Under Freytag and Edmond, 
 
credibility, the decision of the ALJ will be given special weight”); Barnett, supra note 119, 
at 811–12 (noting that in some agencies, ALJ findings “are generally final”). 
185 In re Fuller, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 48406, 2003 WL 22016309, at *7 (Aug. 25, 
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
186 In re Clawson, Sec. Exchange Act Release No. 48143, 2003 WL 21539920, at *2 (July 9, 
2003) (“We accept [an ALJ’s] credibility finding, absent overwhelming evidence to the 
contrary”); see also In re Pelosi, Sec. Act Release No. 3805, 2014 W.L. 1247415, at *2 (Mar. 
27, 2014) (“The Commission gives considerable weight to the credibility determination of 
a law judge since it is based on hearing the witnesses’ testimony and observing their 
demeanor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
187 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(b)(iii)(2) (1995). 
188 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring) (citing Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 
378 (1901)); see also Barnett, supra note 119, at 813 (discussing Landry). 
189 Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 45 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
190 17 C.F.R. § 201.411(f) (1995). 
191 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 542 (2010) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.) (“As Justice Scalia has 
observed, administrative law judges (ALJs) ‘are all executive officers.’”) (quoting Freytag 
v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991)) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment, joined by Kennedy, J.). 
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ALJs seemingly fit the description of inferior officers.  The implications 
would be very unsettling to the administrative state, however.  Consequently, 
the Supreme Court may seek to avoid this result. 
C. ALJs’ Double For-Cause Removal Does Not Infringe on Executive Power by 
Insulating ALJs from Removal 
Litigants have invoked Free Enterprise to argue that ALJs are also too far 
removed from the President’s control,192 but unlike in Free Enterprise, the 
removal power argument here is unlikely to succeed.  The Constitution 
states that the President must “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”193  To accomplish this, the President must be able to hold officers 
accountable and “have the possibility of directing discretionary legal duties, 
even those assigned to other officers.”194 
ALJs are only removable by the agency that appoints them “for good 
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on 
the record after opportunity for hearing.”195  Both SEC Commissioners and 
MSPB members are removable for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office.”196  However, because ALJs are impartial adjudicators, 
their double layer of protection is likely constitutional. 
1. History of the Removal Power 
Although the Constitution is silent with respect to the removal of 
officers, Myers v. United States held that “as [the President’s] selection of 
administrative officers is essential to the execution of the laws by him, so 
must be his power of removing those for whom he can not continue to be 
responsible.”197  The Court later narrowed Myers’ scope, permitting Congress 
to condition the President’s removal of an Officer only “for inefficiency, 
neglect of duty or malfeasance.”198  The Court ruled that because the FTC 
exercised quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative power, it was not part of the 
executive branch.199  As such, the agency’s commissioners may act 
 
192 Interestingly, this argument represents a complete reversal from the Due Process 
argument, see infra Part IV, and alleges that ALJs are too far removed from executive 
control, as opposed to too beholden to their superiors. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
194 See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L. REV. 
1205, 1225 (2014). 
195 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)–(b) (1995). 
196 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 486–87 (citation omitted); 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (1995). 
197 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). 
198 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935). 
199 Id. at 628.  See also Rao, supra note 194, at 1230. 
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“independently of executive control.”200  In Morrison v. Olson, the Court held 
that an independent counsel was an inferior officer but ruled that Congress 
still could condition removal on for-cause reasons.201 
Looking at these decisions together, a principal202 or inferior203 officer 
may be given for-cause protection from the President’s removal power, 
depending on their functions. 
2. Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB 
In Free Enterprise, the Court addressed whether the PCAOB could be 
shielded by two layers of for-cause removal.204  It held that Sarbanes-Oxley 
imposed a “new type of restriction” on the President: “two levels of 
protection from removal for those who nonetheless exercise significant 
executive power.  Congress cannot limit the President’s authority in this 
way.”205 
However, Free Enterprise’s holding is unlikely to apply to ALJs.  Unlike 
PCAOB members, “Executive branch adjudicators are not generally thought 
to have discretion in th[e] [policymaking or enforcement] sense, but rather 
like other judges to be applying the law to particular facts.”206  The Court 
suggested as much, noting that the facts in Free Enterprise were unique.207 
Additionally, the Court is likely to seek to limit Free Enterprise’s holding.  
Even in its decision, the Court distinguished ALJs and the PCAOB, noting 
that ALJs exercise adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking 
power; thus their double for-cause removal likely does not infringe 
unconstitutionally on the President’s removal power.208 
 
200 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629.  Some question whether Humphrey’s Executor’s 
reasoning is still applicable, since a majority of the Supreme Court has shifted from a 
formalist approach to a functionalist one, recognizing that “every federal entity must be 
accountable to one of the three branches.”  Rao, supra note 194, at 1230–31. 
201 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 (1988) (“[T]he President’s power to remove an 
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely 
executive.’”). 
202 See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 629. 
203 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689–91. 
204 The Board was removable “‘for good cause shown,’ ‘in accordance with’ certain 
procedures.”  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 486 
(2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2002)). 
205 Id. at 514. 
206 Rao, supra note 194, at 1248. 
207 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 503 (“Congress enacted an unusually high standard that 
must be met before Board members may be removed.”). 
208 Id. at 507 n.10; see also Nelson, supra note 3, at 412 (“The majority itself thus recognized 
that the adjudicatory function makes the ALJs different from PCAOB members and 
properly beyond the reach of presidential removal power.”).  But see Freytag v. Comm’r, 
501 U.S. 868, 909 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that executive branch adjudicators exercise executive power). 
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Another reason to doubt that Free Enterprise’s holding will be extended to 
ALJs is that the implications could be enormous.209  Indeed, some question 
the strength of the distinctions the Court drew between the PCAOB and 
ALJs and suggest it was done to avoid such far-reaching implications.210  It is 
not entirely clear that ALJs perform only an adjudicatory role.211  The Court 
took a formalist approach toward the removal power, “begin[ning] with the 
premise that the structure of our constitutional democracy requires that the 
President oversee the work of his subordinates and ensure they are faithfully 
executing the laws,” regardless of the functions of those subordinates.212  
The dissent instead took a functionalist approach, recognizing the need for 
bureaucratic independence and stressing that the “second layer of removal 
protection ‘does not significantly interfere with the President’s executive 
Power,’ and ‘violates no separation-of-powers principle.’”213  The dissent also 
recognized that the SEC’s “various means of control” over the PCAOB, even 
without removal power, were sufficient to place the PCAOB under 
presidential control.214  Some academics believe Free Enterprise’s holding 
could have a huge impact on agencies, depending on the Court’s willingness 
to extend it.215 
Moreover, it would be unsound to extend Free Enterprise to ALJs, since 
adjudicators need the independence that for-cause removal provides.216  It 
 
209 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether ALJs who 
perform important administrative duties are implicated by the majority’s rule). 
210 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 119, at 815 (“The majority’s proposed distinctions are 
unsound as stated . . . .”). 
211 Cf. John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
33, 38 n.23 (2002) (noting that “in [NLRB’s] first fifty years of existence[,] the agency did 
not promulgate a single rule.  Instead, it chose to make all decisions through 
adjudication.”). 
212 Neomi Rao, Symposium, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing Agency Independence in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2553 (2011). 
213 Id. at 2547 (quoting Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
214 Id. at 2555 (discussing instruments of control mentioned by Justice Breyer that place the 
PCAOB under presidential control). 
215 See, e.g., id. at 2544–45 (“The Chief Justice’s opinion in time may be viewed like Marbury v. 
Madison . . . . [T]he Court’s proof—its emphasis on the importance of presidential 
control and accountability—calls into question the constitutionality of agency 
independence more generally.”); Nelson, supra note 3, at 417–18 (“[T]here is no reason 
to bring ALJs’ more limited and purely adjudicatory roles closer to presidential removal.  
Such a radical outcome, with a serious adverse impact on the fairness of the 
administrative adjudicatory system, is not required by Free Enterprise’s treatment of PCAOB 
members.”); David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1193–94 
(2016) (“The problem with these cases is that they seek to undo an institution that has 
been part of the furniture of administrative law since the passage of the APA.  If taken 
seriously, they would undo most of the work of [ALJs], not just for the SEC, but also for 
other agencies as well.”). 
216 See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (noting that Congress “chose to 
establish a Commission to adjudicate . . . claims . . . . free from the control or coercive 
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seems that “[a]t a minimum, within independent agencies, [Free Enterprise] 
preserves the second layer of removal protection only for dedicated 
adjudicators.”217 
III. THE IMPACT ON THE SEC AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IF 
THE SUPREME COURT WERE TO FIND AN APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
VIOLATION 
If the Supreme Court were to rule that ALJs are inferior officers, and 
that they cannot be separated from the President’s control by two layers of 
for-cause removal protections, the implications could be far-reaching.  With 
respect to the Take Care Clause, going forward, Congress and the Court 
would have to figure out how to reconcile between ensuring that ALJs are 
sufficiently impartial and independent of their agencies—thereby ensuring 
due process—while at the same time guaranteeing that they are sufficiently 
subject to presidential removal.  It is not clear how this would be 
accomplished. 
This section focuses on the implications of an Appointments Clause 
violation, since it appears more likely than a removal power issue.  This 
Comment argues that the potential effect on SEC adjudications is likely to 
be limited to non-final cases.  With respect to the administrative state as a 
whole, the impact is uncertain.  It is unclear that litigants would be willing to 
challenge the appointments in agencies whose ALJs preside over less 
contentious hearings.  Further, it is not apparent which other agencies have 
appointed their ALJs improperly. 
A. Impact of an Appointments Clause Violation on the SEC 
If the current SEC challenges—those that have not yet been subject to a 
final agency ruling—prevail and the Supreme Court were to rule that the 
only constitutional defect is the Appointments Clause violation, then the 
SEC would have to appoint its ALJs properly.  However, this defect would 
not have a substantial effect on the substance of SEC proceedings, which is 
why it is curious that the SEC has not cured it.  Several district court judges 
have even commented that the SEC has a simple remedy: have the 
 
influence, direct or indirect, of either the Executive or the Congress. . . . [A] fortiori must 
it be inferred that Congress did not wish to . . . [allow] removal by the President for no 
reason other than that he preferred to have on that Commission men of his own 
choosing.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) 
(2012) (requiring that a hearing officer not be “responsible to or subject to the 
supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of 
investigative or prosecuting functions”). 
217 Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2419 (2011). 
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Commission appoint all of its ALJs.218  Yet the SEC has resisted this “easy 
fix,”219 presumably because having the Commissioners reappoint the ALJs 
may expose past decisions to scrutiny.220 
Assuming the SEC was required to appoint its ALJs directly, the litigants 
then would have to endure the very proceedings they have been 
challenging, with little effect on the (likely adverse) outcome.  Thus, the 
strongest legal challenge—the Appointments Clause claim—is unlikely to 
have a large practical impact.  By contrast, the Due Process and Equal 
Protection claims, discussed below in Part IV, are weaker legal claims, but 
have led to reforms to the in-house proceedings, initiated by both the SEC 
and Congress.  These claims are more likely to lessen the incongruity 
between the proceedings brought in-house and those brought in federal 
court. 
Even if there is an Appointments Clause violation, the effect on prior 
SEC rulings would be cabined.  Although a defect would invalidate a 
resulting order,221 it would probably only impact cases that have raised direct 
challenges, namely those not yet subject to a final decision.222  Since a final 
Commission order must be appealed within sixty days, the number of 
 
218 See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (“Hill I”) (“[T]he ALJ’s 
appointment could easily be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue an 
appointment.”). 
219 See Letter at 1, Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15-cv-357), ECF No. 
41 (noting that the judge in Hill “appears to have been opining on the ease of remedying 
the likely constitutional defect in the SEC ALJ’s appointment . . . . [The 
judge] apparently believes that the Commissioners could, with little difficulty and 
consistent with the Appointments Clause, appoint the ALJ as if he were an inferior 
officer”).  However, the SEC did not address whether it was an easy fix or whether it 
would consider appointing the ALJs in this manner.  Instead, the SEC has chosen to 
respond to the Due Process challenges and proposed new rules, which may have a greater 
impact on future SEC proceedings.  See infra Part IV.B. 
220 Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Appointments Clause Problem with ALJs, 
REUTERS (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/06/17/why-the-
sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-aljs (pointing out that 
reappointment of ALJs could be taken as an admission that prior appointments were not 
constitutionally sound). 
221 See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“A defect in the appointment 
of an ‘examiner’ (precursor of today’s ALJ) was, if properly raised, ‘an irregularity which 
would invalidate a resulting order.’”) (quoting United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, 
Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)). 
222 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 543 (1982) (citing favorably to the common 
law rule that “in both civil and criminal litigation, . . . a change in law will be given effect 
[only] while a case is on direct review”) (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
(1965) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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implicated cases is limited.223  However, any litigant still before the SEC or a 
court of appeals may properly raise this challenge.224 
The de facto officer doctrine jurisprudence225 should preclude litigants 
from raising the Appointments Clause challenge on collateral appeal.  The 
de facto officer doctrine is “an ancient but cloudy body of law designed to 
protect the acts of officials whose title to office has been challenged.”226  It 
was developed in Buckley v. Valeo, where the Court held that even though the 
Federal Election Committee’s composition was invalid, that “should not 
affect the validity of the Commission’s administrative actions and 
determinations to this date . . . .”227  Thus, the doctrine “guards against the 
‘chaos’ that would otherwise result by protecting the validity of acts 
performed by a public officer whose appointment has been deemed 
invalid.”228  However, its impact was narrowed in Ryder v. United States.229 
In all likelihood, only litigants who raised the issue on direct appeal will 
be able to take advantage of a decision invalidating ALJs’ appointments.  
Collateral attack is unavailable, since the ALJ position is itself legally created 
by Congress, and all that must be cured is the appointment.230 
The SEC will likely be unable to invoke the de facto officer doctrine to 
shield itself from direct challenges, however.  The de facto officer doctrine 
“provided a defense when a party challenged government action based not 
on the invalidity of the law applied, but based on the invalidity of the public 
officer carrying out the action.”231  In Ryder, the Supreme Court declined to 
apply that doctrine because the challenge was raised directly during the 
agency appeal.232  The Court recognized the need to carve out an exception 
to the doctrine when one “makes a timely challenge to the constitutional 
validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case,” since to 
 
223 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012). 
224 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 177 (1995) (holding that because the Appointments 
Clause challenge was properly raised on direct appeal, the Court of Military Appeals 
erred in affirming the decision through the de facto officer doctrine). 
225 See Deepak Gupta, The Consumer Protection Bureau and the Constitution, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 
945, 964–72 (2013) (explaining the de facto officer doctrine). 
226 Id. at 947. 
227 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 142 (1976) (per curiam). 
228 Gupta, supra note 225, at 960. 
229 Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995).  See Gupta, supra note 225, at 965 (observing 
that Ryder appears to narrow the de facto officer doctrine). 
230 See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182 (“[T]he title of a person acting with color of authority, even if 
he be not a good officer in point of law, cannot be collaterally attacked.”); Ex parte Ward, 
173 U.S. 452, 454 (1899) (“[W]here a court has jurisdiction of an offense and of the 
accused, and the proceedings are otherwise regular, a conviction is lawful, although the 
judge holding the court may be only an officer de facto, and . . . the validity of the title of 
such judge . . . cannot be determined [collaterally].”). 
231 Gupta, supra note 225, at 966. 
232 Ryder, 515 U.S. at 187–88. 
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hold otherwise “would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause 
challenges with respect to questionable judicial appointments.”233  That logic 
seems to apply to the present cases and might prevent the SEC from 
invoking the doctrine to avoid having to retry cases raising Appointments 
Clause challenges that have not reached final judgment. 
However, it is possible that there could be a different result here and 
that the Court would not require any re-hearings.  In Ryder, the issue was 
that the Court of Military Appeals234 recently had ruled that the Court of 
Military Review judges were inferior officers,235 but held that that ruling 
should be applied only prospectively.236  The Supreme Court disagreed and 
opted not to invoke the remedial discretion doctrine, noting that “there is 
not the sort of grave disruption or inequity involved in awarding 
retrospective relief to this petitioner that would bring [the remedial 
discretion] doctrine into play,” since there were only seven to ten cases 
pending on direct review.237  Here, there are likely more cases implicated, 
possibly leading the Court not to permit even current litigants to use the 
improper appointments to obtain new hearings.  Additionally, the Court in 
Ryder noted that the higher military court had a limited scope of review.238 
However, here the SEC reviews ALJ decisions de novo, which might support 
application of the remedial discretion doctrine, since the plaintiffs did not 
clearly suffer harm.239  Nonetheless, I argue that for direct challenges, the 
Court will require new hearings for those cases that raised the challenge on 
direct appeal, as it did in Ryder.240  To hold otherwise would be to 
disincentivize Appointments Clause challenges, which was the exact concern 
that motivated the outcome in Ryder. 
 
233 Id. at 182–83. 
234 See id. at 187 (noting that the Court of Military Appeals is “[t]he court of last resort in the 
military justice system”). 
235 U.S. v. Carpenter, 37 M.J. 291, 296 (1993). 
236  Ryder, 515 U.S. at 188. 
237 Id. at 185. 
238 See id. at 187 (noting that because the higher court had a limited scope of review, it was 
not harmless error). 
239 See Landry v FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring) 
(finding that ALJs are inferior officers, but concurring in the decision to affirm the 
agency’s dismissal because the complainant “suffered no prejudicial error”). 
240 See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-
Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 529 (2014) (noting that the Court in Ryder required 
a new hearing for the petitioner because of the improper appointment); see also Gupta, 
supra note 225, at 969 (elaborating on the Court’s decision for the remedy that it 
provided in Ryder). 
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B. Recent Appointments Clause Violations 
Looking at how two recent unconstitutional appointments impacted the 
effected agencies provides further insight into the possible effects of an 
Appointments Clause violation, although neither appears to be much help 
to the SEC. 
1. National Labor Relations Board 
On January 4, 2012, President Obama appointed three NLRB members 
as recess appointments.  This action was challenged on the grounds that the 
Senate was not actually in recess and that President Obama simply had 
decided it was because senators were refusing to confirm his 
appointments.241  In NLRB v. Noel Canning, the Court held that the 
appointments were unconstitutional.242  Thus, the NLRB lacked the 
statutorily mandated quorum from January 4, 2012 until July 30, 2013, when 
the Senate confirmed the appointments.  Consequently, the NLRB “issued 
roughly 700 reported and unreported decisions while sitting on quorum-less 
boards.  Each of those decisions is arguably invalid.”243  Some contended that 
the de facto officer doctrine could be used to avoid relitigating the 100 cases 
still pending in appeals courts.244 
On remand, rather than relitigate the case, the NLRB stated that it 
considered the case de novo and agreed with the rationale set forth in the 
now-vacated Decision and Order.  Accordingly, it affirmed the judge’s 
rulings, findings, and conclusions and adopted the judge’s recommended 
Order.245  The D.C. Circuit affirmed.246  The NLRB also ratified every agency 
action taken.247  The NLRB likely will rubberstamp every decision, as it did in 
 
241  Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers Without a Senate 
Confirmation Vote?, 22 YALE L.J. 940, 943 (2013). 
242 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2578 (2014). 
243 Bryan J. Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-Powers Dialogue Continues, 2014 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 221, 252–53 (2014).  
244 See, e.g., Ryan J. Levan, Do We Have A Quorum?: Anticipating Agency Vacancies and the Prospect 
for Judicial Remedy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 205–06 (2015) (illustrating Justice 
Scalia’s remarks that the government could sufficiently depend on the de facto officer 
doctrine to validate decisions made by NLRB appointees). 
245 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 361 NLRB No. 129, 2014 WL 7189095, at *1 (Dec. 16, 2014). 
246 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 823 F.3d 76, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
247 Press Release, NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency Actions Taken 
During Period when Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly Appointed 
(Aug. 4, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-officials-ratify-
agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court (declaring that “[t]he National 
Labor Relations Board unanimously ratified all administrative, personnel, and 
proceurement matters taken by the Board”). 
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2010 when the Court also invalidated hundreds of its decisions for lack of a 
quorum.248 
It is uncertain whether the SEC would be able to replicate the NLRB’s 
tactic of rubber-stamping old rulings.  Unlike the NLRB, it was a hearing 
officer, not a reviewing one, whose appointment was defective.  As such, the 
SEC may have to hold a new hearing for any litigant whose case had not 
reached final judgment.  However, it is also possible that the newly and 
properly appointed ALJs could review the record amassed by the defectively 
appointed ALJs and rubber-stamp the outcomes. 
The SEC also may try and distinguish Noel Canning, since the 
Commission reviewed the hearing officer’s actions de novo and therefore 
any error was harmless.  This Comment does not believe the SEC would be 
successful.249 
2. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Similar to the NLRB, the CFPB Director, Richard Cordray, was 
appointed improperly as a result of Senate Republicans’ refusal to confirm 
anyone for the position due to political opposition to the Board’s 
existence.250  Cordray was not appointed until July 16, 2013.251  Noel Canning 
would have been applicable to the CFPB.  However, like the NLRB, Cordray, 
once confirmed, moved to ratify every action he took during that period.252  
Cordray’s actions similarly are not replicable by the SEC, since the 
circumstances are distinguishable.  The CFPB’s authorizing statute stated: 
“The [Treasury] Secretary is authorized to perform the functions of the 
Bureau under this part until the Director of the Bureau is confirmed by the 
Senate in accordance with [12 U.S.C. § 5491].”253  Accordingly, because 
“Dodd-Frank empowers the Acting Secretary of the Treasury to ratify certain 
actions of the Bureau when no director is in place[, t]his recourse along 
 
248 See, e.g., J.S. Carambola, LLC, 355 N.L.R.B. 367, 367 (2010) (“The Board has reviewed the 
record in light of the exceptions and brief, and has adopted the hearing officer’s findings 
and recommendations to the extent and for the reasons stated in the May 28, 2008 
Decision.”). 
249 See supra note 240 and accompanying text. 
250 Danielle Douglas, Senate Confirms Cordray to Head Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 




252 See Notice of Ratification, 78 Fed. Reg. 53734 (Aug. 30, 2013) (“I believe that the actions I 
took during the period I was serving as a recess appointee were legally authorized and 
entirely proper.  To avoid any possible uncertainty, however, I hereby affirm and ratify 
any and all actions I took during that period.”). 
253 12 U.S.C. § 5586(a) (2010). 
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with the ‘de facto officer’ doctrine provides a sense of security for existing 
Bureau promulgations.”254 
Although it is outside the scope of this Comment, it is also worth noting 
that the CFPB’s Director position has been challenged and was found to 
violate Article II.255 
C. Possible Repercussions for ALJs in Other Agencies 
Since many other agencies also rely heavily on ALJs,256 the implications of 
an Appointments Clause defect could extend beyond the SEC and send 
ripples through the administrative state.  Its potential scope depends on 
both the nature of the functions and the extent of authority wielded by ALJs 
in other agencies, as well as the manner in which they were appointed.257  As 
an initial matter, any ALJ in a non-department agency is, arguably, 
unconstitutionally appointed.258  At least one agency was not willing to take 
any chances and preemptively had its department heads appoint its ALJs.259  
At least one agency appears to properly appoint its ALJs and therefore is not 
implicated by this issue.260 
The agency that would be most impacted by an adverse Appointments 
Clause ruling is the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).  The SSA 
employs 1400 ALJs, who have a caseload of 832,000.261  Like SEC ALJs, SSA 
ALJs conduct hearings, manage factual information,262 judge witness 
 
254 S. Austin King, Mounting a Judicial Challenge to President Barack Obama’s Recess Appointment 
of Richard Cordray: The Constitutional Mandate of Standing, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 305, 330 
(2013). 
255 PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
256 For a list of agencies that utilize ALJs, see Agencies Employing Administrative Law Judges, 
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, http://www.aalj.org/agencies-employing-administrative-law-
judges (last visited  Dec. 29, 2016). 
257 See Free Enter. Fund. V. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 556–92 apps. B 
& C (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that there are approximately 1284 ALJs, whose 
dual layer of for-cause removal could be constitutionally suspect, particularly if they have 
been defectively appointed). 
258 Barnett, supra note 119, at 810 n.77 (“For each ALJ appointment, one must know which 
entity is appointing and whether that entity is a department.”).  For a list of agencies that 
“may not qualify as departments,” see id. 
259 Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix to Ward off ALJ Constitutional Challenges, 
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlike-
sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutional-challenges. 
260 See Press Release, NLRB Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Appoints Four New Administrative 
Law Judges (Nov. 4 2013), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
appoints-four-new-administrative-law-judges (“The National Labor Relations Board today 
announced the appointments of [various individuals] as [ALJs] . . . .”). 
261 Lubbers, supra note 16, at 5.  The SSA employs approximately 85% of all ALJs.  Id. 
262 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (1995). 
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credibility,263 issue subpoenas, and question witnesses.264  They also issue 
written decisions and “give the findings of fact and the reasons for the 
decision.”265  Indeed, there is a much stronger argument that SSA ALJs 
should be considered inferior officers,266 since not every SSA ALJ decision is 
reviewed by the Appeals Council, and it becomes binding if the Council 
declines to hear it.267  Thus, a party is not guaranteed review of an SSA ALJ’s 
decision. 
It is unclear how the SSA appoints all its ALJs.  Unlike the SEC, its 
regulations state that the Commissioner appoints ALJs in disability hearings, 
which would quash an Appointments Clause issue.268  However, in a separate 
benefits section, an SSA regulation states that the “Deputy Commissioner for 
Disability Adjudication and Review, or his or her delegate,” appoints ALJs, 
which would expose the SSA to an Appointments Clause challenge.269  That 
said, there may be practical reasons why these proceedings would not be 
challenged.  Since a subject of an SSA hearing is seeking government 
benefits as opposed to defending against an enforcement action, he or she 
has less reason to challenge the ALJ’s constitutionality.270  Nonetheless, it is 
possible that § 404.929 could be challenged. 
Whether ALJs are inferior officers implicates other agencies as well.  
Several agencies’ ALJs, like the SSA’s, may issue final decisions in certain 
instances and thus likely would be inferior officers.271  As such, the 
constitutionality of these ALJs is contingent on the nature of their 
appointments.  Several of these agencies’ ALJs are not appointed by 
 
263 See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the analysis that 
ALJs must undertake when assessing the credibility of witnesses’ testimony). 
264 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)–(e) (1995). 
265 Id. § 404.943(c)(1). 
266 See Stack, supra note 217, at 2408 n.101 (noting that SSA ALJs are inferior officers, “even 
under Landry’s restrictive reading of Freytag”). 
267 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (1995). 
268 See id. § 405.301(b) (“The Commissioner will appoint an administrative law judge to 
conduct the hearing.”). 
269 Id. § 404.929. 
270 Indeed, the government is not even represented at SSA benefit proceedings.  Richard J. 




271 Timony, supra note 39, at 811 n.25 (listing agencies that allow ALJs to issue final agency 
determinations: Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, Fed. Mine Safety and 
Health Review Comm’n, Civil Aeronautics Bd., and the Int’l Trade Comm’n).  Other 
agencies whose ALJs may issue final determinations include: Small Bus. Admin., 13 C.F.R. 
§ 134.409 (2016); NLRB, 29 C.F.R. § 101.12(b) (2015); U.S. Postal Serv., 39 C.F.R. § 
966.11 (2015); and CFTC, 17 C.F.R. § 10.84(c) (2016). 
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Department Heads.272  While this Comment is not aware of any such 
challenges, any agency whose ALJs are inferior officers could find itself in 
the same predicament as the SEC. 
IV. EVEN IF ALJS ARE NOT INFERIOR OFFICERS, THE CURRENT 
LITIGATION HAS ALTERED SEC PRACTICES GOING FORWARD 
The Due Process and Equal Protection challenges to the SEC’s use of 
ALJs are unlikely to succeed.  However, the publicity garnered by these 
complaints has pressured the SEC to funnel more enforcement actions to 
federal court and led it to propose new rules to modernize its in-house 
hearings.  It has also driven Congress to propose the Due Process 
Restoration Act. 
A. Merits of Due Process and Equal Protection Claims Against the SEC 
This subsection briefly describes the Due Process and Equal Protection 
challenges, since they already have been thoroughly analyzed.273  None of 
them are likely to succeed. 
1. Due Process 
Because of the disparate amount of process afforded to litigants in 
federal court versus in SEC hearings, there have been significant complaints 
that litigants are entitled to more process than the SEC provides.274  
However, such claims are unlikely to succeed, given that the SEC’s Rules of 
Practice “are, in most respects, similar to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . . [and] are virtually identical to U.S. district court bench 
trials.”275 
 
272 See, e.g., Small Bus. Admin., 13 C.F.R. § 134.218(a) (2016) (“The [Assistant Administrator 
for OHA] will assign all cases . . . to an [ALJ].”); Dep’t of Labor, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.1(f) 
(2015) (“Judge means an [ALJ] appointed by the Chairman of the Commission.”); U.S. 
Postal Serv., 39 C.F.R. § 953.10 (2015) (“The presiding officer at any hearing shall be 
an [ALJ] qualified in accordance with law (5 U.S.C. [§] 3105) and assigned by the 
Judicial Officer.”). 
273 For an in-depth analysis of these challenges, see Zaring, supra note 215. 
274  See, e.g., Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (alleging that “the SEC’s choice 
to pursue them administratively, as opposed to suing them in a United States District 
Court, [had] deprive[d] them of their rights to due process”). 
275 Daniel F. Solomon, Summary of Administrative Law Judge Responsibilities, 31 J. NAT’L ASSOC. 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 475, 516 (2011); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1973) 
(“[F]ederal administrative law requires that agency adjudication contain many of the 
same safeguards as are available in the judicial process . . . . [and] the role of the 
modern . . . [ALJ] is functionally comparable to that of a judge.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Zaring, supra note 215, at 1197 (“The Supreme Court has praised the 
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Depending on a case’s complexity—which the SEC determines—an 
initial decision must be rendered within 120, 210, or 300 days, with at most 
four months to prepare for the hearing.276  Additionally, the SEC’s rules 
limit discovery277 and allow pre-trial depositions only when a witness will be 
unable to testify at a hearing.278  Moreover, it often can take over a year 
before a case makes its way into federal court,279 at which point the court will 
defer on disputed facts,280 making reversal difficult to attain.  Although there 
is a looser evidentiary standard in SEC hearings, which permits the SEC to 
use hearsay evidence that otherwise would be excluded under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence,281 hearsay is admissible because “[t]he rules of evidence 
are relaxed in an administrative proceeding.”282  The SEC also defers to its 
ALJs’ findings and accepts “credibility finding[s], absent overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary.”283  Lastly, some argue that there is an inherent 
 
process offered by ALJs in the past, and agencies have been expressly permitted to 
combine the functions of enforcement and adjudication under one roof.”). 
276 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2) (1995); see also Ryan, supra note 19 (noting that there is not 
enough time to prepare for a hearing given that the SEC often spends years building 
cases).  By contrast, Article III judges “follow no statutorily imposed deadline.”  Ryan 
Jones, Comment, The Fight over Home Court: An Analysis of the SEC’s Increased Use of 
Administrative Proceedings, 68 SMU L. REV. 507, 524 (2015). 
277 See Atkins & Bondi, supra note 30, at 411–12 (noting that the SEC is criticized for “failing 
to share critical incriminating—and most importantly, exculpatory—evidence that 
the SEC has gathered”).  Judge Jed Rakoff, a noted critic of the SEC’s use of ALJs, stated 
that the proceedings provide “much more limited discovery than federal actions, with no 
provision whatsoever for either depositions or interrogatories.”  Jed S. Rakoff, PLI 
Securities Regulation Institute Keynote Address 7 (Nov. 5, 2014).  Judge Rakoff also has 
criticized the SEC for exerting undue pressure to force settlements and using consent 
judgments and has wondered, “from where does the constitutional warrant for such 
unchecked and unbalanced administrative power derive?”  SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., 
Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 379, 380 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
278 17 C.F.R. § 201.233(b) (1995). 
279 Ryan, supra note 19. 
280 See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(4) (2012) (“The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if 
supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.”); see also Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[A] reviewing court will review more 
critically the Board’s findings of fact if they are contrary to the administrative law judge’s 
factual conclusions.”). 
281 See, e.g., Gonnella, Exchange Act Release No. 1579, at *2 (July 2, 2014) (“There is no per se 
bar to the admission of hearsay evidence in the Commission’s administrative proceedings. 
. . . [H]earsay evidence that is relevant is admissible in administrative proceedings.”). 
282 Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement: Hearing on H.R. 114-9 Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong.  26 (2015) 
(presenting the statement of Andrew J. Ceresney, Director, SEC Division of 
Enforcement).  The Supreme Court also has noted that “differences in the origin and 
function of administrative agencies preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of 
procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and experience of 
courts.”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
283 Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1298 (2015). 
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peculiarity in having the SEC Commissioners—the very people who 
authorize the Enforcement Division to initiate an action—review whether 
the Enforcement Division has failed to prove its case.284 
However, some argue that these concerns are overblown.285  Litigants in 
SEC proceedings are given more process than is constitutionally required in 
an agency hearing.286  As such, this argument is unlikely to advance far in 
federal court. 
Another challenge leveled against the SEC is the lack of a jury, which 
otherwise would be available in federal court.287  This argument is similarly 
unconvincing, since Congress is permitted to assign cases to administrative 
proceedings that otherwise would be brought in federal court.288 
Academics also question whether ALJs are sufficiently impartial.289  Even 
though ALJs are removable only for-cause, their “effective life 
tenure . . . loses some of its sheen because of the ambiguity of the good 
cause standard . . . .”290  Indeed, in a recent SEC hearing in which the ALJ’s 
independence was questioned, the SEC invited the ALJ to submit an affidavit 
stating whether he felt undue pressure from the SEC to rule in its favor 
 
284 Walfish, supra note 19; cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950) 
(explaining that one of the purposes of the APA was “to curtail and change the practice 
of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge”), overruled on 
other grounds by Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133 (1995). 
285 See Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, supra note 282, at 26 (providing Ceresney’s 
statement that there is “more extensive discovery. . . . [for] documents and items that are 
in [its] file” because the SEC “turn[s] over [its] whole file, typically within 7 days” as 
required by SEC rules); see also Zaring, supra note 215, at 1198 (noting that “ALJs have 
been held up as examples of due process” by the Supreme Court); id. (citing Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 759 (2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he similarities between adjudication before ALJs and 
before federal district court judges are overwhelming.”). 
286 See Zaring, supra note 215, at 1197–99 (arguing that parties appearing before SEC ALJs 
are not constitutionally entitled to more process than they receive). 
287 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 17; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. VII (“In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . 
.”).  
288 Zaring, supra note 215, at 1205. 
289 See Barnett, supra note 119, at 827 (questioning whether “the current administrative 
system is in excellent health,” but noting that “[d]espite concerns over ALJ 
impartiality . . . the Supreme Court may not find a due process violation, given its 
wariness of upsetting long-standing administrative practices”); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized 
Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 352 (1991) (“[T]hose who work 
within an agency are subject to a multitude of open or subtle socializing pressures.”); L. 
Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 523, 537 (1990) 
(“Large numbers of hearing officers . . . are non-tenured.  They must, nevertheless, 
render independent and impartial decisions.”).  But see Harold J. Krent & Lindsay DuVall, 
Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the 
Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 4 n.11 (2005) (“[T]he APA 
protections insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates.”). 
290 Barnett, supra note 119, at 807. 
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and—in a move that certainly raised more than a few eyebrows—the ALJ 
refused.291  As of May 6, 2015, that same ALJ—who has worked for the SEC 
since 2011—had never ruled against the SEC.292  Additionally, a former SEC 
ALJ, Lillian McEwen, stated that she felt the procedures unfairly favored the 
SEC, that the Chief ALJ had “questioned [her] loyalty,” and that she was 
“expected to work under an assumption that the burden was on the people 
who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the agency said they 
did.”293  The SEC’s Office of Inspector General investigated these 
allegations294 and cleared the SEC of any improper bias toward its ALJs.295  
Possibly undermining the claim that ALJs are insufficiently independent, 
one ALJ recently granted a subpoena request for “[a]ll documents and 
communications that support, or reflect or are related to the allegations 
made by Lillian McEwen,”296 thereby permitting an inquiry into the merits of 
the impartiality accusations. 
Others have criticized the disparity between the SEC’s success in federal 
court and in administrative proceedings,297 which the SEC has 
acknowledged.298  However, Supreme Court precedent suggests that ALJs are 
not too partial.299  Accordingly, this argument is unlikely to succeed absent 
proof that improper pressure is exerted on ALJs. 
 
291 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 9–10, Timbervest, LLC v. SEC, No. 
1:15-cv-02106-LMM, 2015 WL 7597428 (N.D. Ga. June 12, 2015).  
292 Eaglesham, supra note 19. 
293 Id. 
294 Interim Report of Investigation, SEC Office of Inspector General (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/oig-sec-interim-report-investigation-admin-law-
judges.pdf. 
295 Suzanne Barlyn, Watchdog Clears U.S. SEC’s In-House Judges of Bias Allegations, REUTERS 
(Feb. 16, 2016, 4:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-court-bias-
idUSKCN0VP2OL. 
296 Hill, Exchange Act Release No. 2706, at *2 (May 21, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
alj/aljorders/2015/ap-2706.pdf. 
297 Rakoff, supra note 277, at 7. 
298 See Oversight of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, supra note 282, at 26–27 (statement of 
Ceresney) (confirming that in the prior year, the SEC won 100 percent of its cases in 
agency hearings, but won only 11 of 18 cases in federal court).  This disparity did not go 
unnoticed by Congress.  See id. at 27 (Congressman Duffy testifying, “Do you think there 
could be any correlation when you actually hire the judges and you set the rules that you 
win all the cases? . . . .  And you might say . . . . I want to bring more cases in front of the 
judges that I hire and abide by the rules that I set as opposed to letting these cases go into 
Federal court.  And low and behold, wow, I win them all.”). 
299 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975) (“[C]ase law, both federal and state, 
generally rejects the idea that the combination of judging and investigating functions is a 
denial of due process.”) (alterations omitted); Zaring, supra note 215, at 1199–1200 
(noting that people have long complained that the SEC operates as prosecutor and 
judge, but that claim “has never gone very far in the courts”); Barnett, supra note 119, at 
820–21 (“Although certain of these decisions strongly suggest that ALJs are sufficiently 
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2. Equal Protection and Choice of Venue Claims 
Those raising Equal Protection claims argue that the SEC unfairly 
targeted them by forcing them to undergo an in-house proceeding.  They 
claim that the SEC acted arbitrarily with respect to where it chose to bring 
actions, depriving in-house litigants of the benefits of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence.300  However, Congress has 
explicitly allowed the SEC to select its preferred forum.301  Nonetheless, 
claimants note the “lack of any congressional principal guiding the 
Commission’s selection of a forum.”302  In response, the SEC published 
guidelines for how it decides which forum to select,303 which is entitled to 
some degree of deference304 even though the factors the SEC gave are 
vague.305 
Moreover, courts generally defer to an agency’s decision to bring claims 
against individuals.306  The only successful SEC Equal Protection claim this 
Comment is aware of contained particularly egregious facts, wherein the 
challenger was the only one out of twenty-nine co-defendants subjected to 
an in-house hearing.307  That court denied the SEC’s motion to dismiss 
 
impartial in fact and appearance, scholars have not considered the impact of the 
decisions’ limitations, especially after . . . Free Enterprise Fund.”). 
300 See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 23–25. 
301 H.R. REP. NO. 111-687, at 78 (2010).  Dodd-Frank renders “the SEC’s authority in 
administrative penalty proceedings coextensive with its authority to seek penalties in 
Federal court.”  Id. 
302 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 28. 
303 Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, SEC ENF’T DIV., 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcement-approach-forum-selection-contested-
actions.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2016) (listing the non-exhaustive factors it considers: the 
availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum; the 
cost‐, resource‐, and time‐effectiveness of litigation in each forum; fair, consistent, and 
effective resolution of securities law issues). 
304 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (holding “that 
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for 
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” even absent 
administrative formality); see also Zaring, supra note 215, at 1190 (“[T]he agency’s policy 
of initiating more administrative proceedings is a reasonable interpretation of the 
amendments to Dodd-Frank authorizing it to do so . . . .”) 
305 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 50, at 29 (claiming that 
the SEC’s guidelines “offer little clarity as to how the SEC goes about selecting the 
forum”). 
306 Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980); cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 
456, 464 (1996) (noting the discretion afforded to federal prosecutors when they are 
deciding whether to bring criminal charges). 
307 See Gupta v. SEC, 796 F. Supp. 2d 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (asserting that “the [SEC]—
having previously filed all of its Galleon-related insider trading actions in this federal 
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because “there is already a well-developed public record of Gupta being 
treated substantially disparately from 28 essentially identical defendants, 
with not even a hint from the SEC, even in their instant papers, as to why 
this should be so.”308  However, the facts in Gupta v. SEC are unique and do 
not seem to pave a path for other litigants to successfully raise equal 
protection claims.309  It also is unclear whether the claim ultimately would 
have succeeded, since the SEC dropped the in-house charges and re-filed 
them in federal court.310  Therefore, those raising Equal Protection claims 
are unlikely to prevail. 
B. Current Efforts to Respond to the Due Process Concerns 
1. Effects on Current SEC Litigation 
Despite contrary rhetoric, the SEC seems to be altering its enforcement 
strategy in response to the complaints and scaling back its use of ALJs in 
contested cases.  In the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2015, the SEC 
brought close to 40% and 50% of its contested cases in-house, respectively, 
which dropped to just over 20% in the third quarter and again to just 11% 
in the fourth quarter.311  The 11% fourth quarter number represents a 
substantial decrease from the 40% brought in the previous year’s fourth 
quarter.312  According to the Wall Street Journal, sources familiar with the 
SEC claim that SEC Director Andrew Ceresney told senior staff to file 
contested cases alleging insider trading or accounting fraud in federal court 
absent good reason to utilize SEC ALJs.313  Indeed, since Hill, the SEC has 
brought every suspected insider trading case in federal court.314  Since May 
 
district—decided it preferred its home turf” and referring to the SEC’s actions as a 
“seeming exercise in forum-shopping”). 
308 Id. at 514. 
309 See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that Gupta’s “broad definition 
misconceives how the Supreme Court and our court have understood the term ‘wholly 
collateral’ in the Thunder Basin line of cases”); Chau v. SEC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 417, 431 
(S.DN.Y. 2014) (noting that Gupta, even if correctly decided, was factually 
distinguishable). 
310 SEC v. Gupta, No. 11 Civ. 7566(JSR), 2012 WL 6767789 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012). 
311 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges: Regulator Sends Fewer Cases to Its Tribunal, 




314 Id.; see, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Pennsylvania Attorney with Insider Trading 
in Advance of Merger Announcement (July 16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-149.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Company Executive with 
Insider Trading (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-24.html; 
Press Release, SEC, Childhood Friends Charged with Insider Trading in Pharmaceutical 
Stocks (June 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-108.html; Press 
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2015, the SEC’s success rate also is down, as four of the last twelve 
defendants in contested cases have been cleared by ALJs, lowering the SEC’s 
success rate to 72%.315 
2. Prospective SEC and Congressional Responses 
Although the SEC claims it is not in response to the ongoing challenges, 
it recently proposed and enacted new rules “to modernize our rules of 
practice for administrative proceedings, including provisions for additional 
time and prescribed discovery for the parties.”316  These rules were recently 
ratified and became effective September 27, 2016.317  They appear to be 
responses to both the negative publicity stemming from the Due Process 
challenges as well as the risk of losing as a result of the Appointments Clause 
challenges. 
Some of the SEC’s rule changes are fairly defendant-friendly.318  The SEC 
will extend the time frame for ALJs to issue decisions, increasing flexibility 
for when the hearing must be held, and making it easier to obtain a 
deadline extension.319  In the most complex ten-month cases, the SEC will 
permit a respondent to take three depositions, or five if there is more than 
one respondent, as well as to request from the hearing officer for leave to 
take two additional depositions.320  The SEC also enacted a rule to toll the 
Rule 360 time deadlines when the Commission is considering settlement 
offers.321 
However, there also are several noticeably agency-friendly changes.  A 
respondent must affirmatively state in its answer any theory for avoiding 
liability, not just affirmative defenses.322  Respondents also must state 
whether they intend to raise as a defense the reliance on professional 
advice.323  The SEC now permits an ALJ or the Commission to quash a 
subpoena not only if it would be “unreasonable, oppressive, or unduly 
 
Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Hedge Fund Manager Leon 
Cooperman with Insider Trading (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-189.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
315 Eaglesham, supra note 311. 
316 Press Release, SEC, supra note 12. 
317 See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. 50212, (July 29, 
2016). 
318 Rather than recite each of the recently proposed rules, I will briefly set forth a few of the 
ones more pertinent to this Comment. 
319 See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 81 Fed. Reg. at 50214 (codified at 
17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2016)). 
320 Id. at 50216 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2016)). 
321 Id. at 50219 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.161 (2016)). 
322 Id. at 50219–20 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.220 (2016)) (enabling the SEC to learn a 
defendant’s theory of the case prior to the hearing). 
323 Id. at 50220 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.220 (2016)). 
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burdensome” but also if it would “unduly delay” the hearing.324  The SEC 
also proposed making it possible to serve an order on a person in a foreign 
country by any “method authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service 
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.”325 
In addition to the SEC’s rules, Congress also has sought to change SEC 
in-house proceedings.  Congress proposed a bill that not only would allow 
for any respondent subject to a cease and desist order to remove the case to 
federal court, but also would raise the required standard of proof in SEC 
proceedings from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing 
evidence.326  If passed, the bill would eviscerate the choice of venue power 
that Dodd-Frank conferred on the SEC. 
However, regardless of what efforts the SEC and Congress undertake to 
better align SEC proceedings with those in federal court, they will fall short 
of what is available to litigants in federal court.327  Further, experienced 
lawyers will continue looking for ways to challenge the SEC’s enforcement 
tactics and its use of ALJs in contested cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The future of ALJs, both within the SEC and throughout the 
administrative state, is at a crossroads.  The impact of a highly publicized 
finding that ALJs are inferior officers could send ripples throughout the 
administrative system.  It could leave uncertain the legitimacy of ALJ 
decisions in other agencies and temporarily destabilize the administrative 
state while agencies scrambled to respond.  However, the actual implications 
on past SEC in-house hearings would be cabined. 
With respect to the current SEC challenges, because the SEC already has 
proposed new rules to modernize its in-house proceedings—regardless of 
the outcome of these Appointments Clause cases—the challengers already 
may have achieved a substantive victory.  As a legal matter, the Due Process 
challenges are not particularly compelling, yet they may result in changes to 
the SEC’s practices that a successful Appointments Clause claim could not 
bring about.  Although some say the changes are still inadequate in 
 
324 Id. at 50218 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 232(e)(2) (2016)). 
325 Id. at 50218–19 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 141(a)(2)(iv) (2016)). 
326 See Due Process Restoration Act of 2015, H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. § 2(a) (2015). 
327 If Congress tried to give ALJs unfettered power in insider trading claims, or make SEC 
proceedings nearly identical to those in federal courts, it may raise other constitutional 
issues.  Cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76 (1982) 
(holding that Article III forbids Congress from granting Article I bankruptcy judges the 
power “to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising under the 
bankruptcy laws”). 
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comparison to what is available in federal court,328 these litigants, by 
pressuring the SEC to reform its proceedings, may unravel a significant 
aspect of Dodd-Frank.  Win or lose in court, if the Due Process Restoration 
Act of 2015 is enacted, these SEC respondents will get what they wanted all 
along: their day in federal court. 
 
 
328 See Eaglesham, supra note 19 (reporting that defense attorneys believe the proposals do 
not go far enough). 
